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Employing a statistical model-building strategy, this study aims to analyse the
United States' bank failures across different size categories (small, medium,
and large). Our results suggest that factors associated with bank failures vary
across respective size categories, and the average marginal effects (AMEs) of
mutually significant covariates also exhibit significant variability across differ-
ent size classes of banks. The results are robust to up-to 3 years of lagged
regression estimates, various control variables, interaction between bank size
and bank charter, alternative bank size classifications, and macroeconomic cri-
sis periods.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Does size matter in predicting bank failures? The answer
to this question would be helpful to policymakers and
bank regulators seeking to improve their understanding
of bank failures across different size categories, and
thereby promoting enhanced stability of the financial sys-
tem. This issue was seriously exaggerated following the
failure of large and complex banks in 2008 (the recent
financial crisis) which resulted in extremely high costs to
national economies, as they were forced to bail them out
in order to restore confidence in the financial markets
(Pais & Stork, 2013). Over the last three decades, several
banks have been criticized for becoming oversized and
thereby carrying the associated higher systemic risk. In
response, several restrictions have been enacted by fed-
eral governments to downsize or split up these banks to
reduce the public finance risk. For instance, the Dodd-
Frank Act of 2010 is a United States (US) federal law
intended to limit banks' involvement in some risky activi-
ties and to ban mergers that result in a financial institution
with total liabilities surpassing 10% of the aggregate con-
solidated liabilities of all financial firms (to prevent the
emergence of “too big to fail” banks [Bertay, Demirgüç-
Kunt, & Huizinga, 2013]). Proponents of the act also argue
that the constraints, particularly size limitation, shall pre-
vent future crises and protect consumers from abusive
financial services practices. However, many argue that
these actions would impair the efficiency of capital alloca-
tion for some banks and add costs to the economy (Aiyar,
Calomiris, & Wieladek, 2014). Others also argue that such
restrictive regulations may lead to the failure of many
small banks deemed “too important to fail”, which may
cause the recurrence of financial crises (De Haan &
Poghosyan, 2012). This debate reveals the need for further
investigation into the heterogeneity of bank failures across
different size classes, to recognize the similarities and dif-
ferences before taking appropriate measures.
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The literature on individual bank failures is extensive
and offers a rich assessment of several aspects of bank
failures (e.g., Berger, Imbierowicz, & Rauch, 2016; Cole
& White, 2012; DeYoung & Torna, 2013; Kolari,
Glennon, Shin, & Caputo, 2002; Lane, Looney, &
Wansley, 1986; Meyer & Pifer, 1970; Schaeck, 2008;
Thomson, 1992; Wheelock & Wilson, 2000). However,
the factors and the extent to which they related to the
probability of bank failures across size classes remain
mostly overlooked.1 This is perhaps surprising because
the literature shows that bank size is as an essential eco-
nomical foundation as the capital (Berger &
Bouwman, 2013), and plays a crucial role in many
dimensions such as performance (e.g., Bertay et al., 2013),
financial stability (e.g., Bhagat, Bolton, & Lu, 2015), scope
(e.g., De Jonghe, Diepstraten, & Schepens, 2015), lending
(e.g., De Haas, Ferreira, & Taci, 2010), funding strategies
(e.g., Loutskina, 2011), and systemic risk (e.g., Laeven,
Ratnovski, & Tong, 2016). Notwithstanding the evidence
of bank size heterogeneity effects on various aspects, par-
ticularly financial stability, the literature lacks a thorough
analysis of determinants and predictability of bank fail-
ures across bank size categories.
Considering the discussion above, the aim of this
study is to empirically analyse whether and how banks'
failure predictors vary across different size categories
(using banks' total assets in a given year t to classify
banks into small, medium, and large banks). Using panel
logistic regression technique, we develop separate failure
prediction models for small, medium, and large banks in
the US (from 1985 until 2016) and report any differences
in comparison to an all-size inclusive failure prediction
model. Another contribution of this paper is that, unlike
previous studies that draws heavily on accounting-based
predictors such as capital, earnings, and liquidity ratios
(e.g., Berger et al., 2016; Cole & Gunther, 1995; Cole &
White, 2012; Kolari et al., 2002); our study follows the
suggestions of Gupta, Gregoriou, and Ebrahimi (2018)
and statistically analyses the relative importance of a
comprehensive set of predictors (found significant in
prior bank failures literature) to develop parsimonious
multivariate failure prediction models.
Thus, in the first step we employ univariate regres-
sion analysis as a variable selection technique to investi-
gate the relative importance of numerous accounting-
based variables used in previous bank failure literature.
Specifically, the broad categories of CAMELS, where the
letters refer to Capital adequacy (e.g., total equity to total
assets ratio), Asset quality (e.g., non-performing loans to
total assets ratio), Management quality (e.g., cost to
income ratio), Earnings (e.g., net interest margin),
Liquidity (e.g., cash and due to total assets ratio), and
Sensitivity to market risk (e.g., trading income to total
operating income ratio); and other categories such as
funding, business model, and growth, are analyzed. We
investigate a total of 61 accounting variables. Univariate
regression analysis shows that average marginal effects
(AMEs) of most accounting-based predictors used in the
literature vary across size categories and across three
respective lagged periods. Generally, the AMEs of respec-
tive covariates (1-year lag) for small banks are higher
compared to estimates obtained for medium and large
banks. However, for 2- and 3-years lagged estimates,
AMEs of large banks are mostly the highest. This sug-
gests that the prediction power of variables for small
banks are stronger on short term, while for large banks
it's stronger for longer horizon forecast. To narrow down
the list of covariates for further multivariate analysis, we
select only those variables that are significant in all three
lagged univariate regression estimates. We repeat this
process for small, medium, and large banks respectively.
The final lists of variables for all, small, medium, and
large banks contain 19, 19, 20, and 21 variables
respectively.
Subsequently, following the multivariate model build-
ing strategy suggested by Gupta et al. (2018), we rank
competing variables based on the magnitude of their
AMEs, and then introduce each variable at a time in des-
cending order of magnitude. We perform this to develop
multivariate models for all, small, medium, and large-
sized banks respectively. The rationale for this approach
is that a variable with a higher value of AME induces
higher change in the failure probability, and thus should
be given priority in the variable selection process (Gupta
et al., 2018). We exclude a variable from the multivariate
models if, when added: (a) it changes the sign of any pre-
viously added variable; (b) it shows the opposite sign to
that generated in univariate regression; (c) it holds the
identical sign to univariate analysis, but is insignificant
with a p-value greater than 0.10; or (d) it makes a previ-
ously introduced variable insignificant with a p-value
greater than 0.10. We end up with varying sets of
covariates with six, seven, six, and five variables (main
variables) for multivariate models for all, small, medium,
and large banks, respectively. Multivariate empirical
results show that factors associated with bank failures
and the magnitudes of mutually significant factors (Aver-
age Marginal Effects) vary across small, medium, and
large size categories.
These results are robust to the presence of control
variables including house price inflation, foreign owner-
ship, and dummies for banking crises and regulators. We
perform an additional robustness test by disaggregating
our sample by banking crises, market crises, and normal
times, and treating them as separate groups. We also use
an alternative size classification. We rerun all
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multivariate regressions separately for all, small,
medium, and large banks, and qualitatively similar
results are obtained.
Our findings emphasize the importance of consider-
ing bank size when designing appropriate policies and
regulations targeted toward enhancing financial stability
and resilience. Future studies should, whenever possible,
separate banks by size category to clearly understand the
heterogeneity in bank failures.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.
In Section 2, we provide a review of literature on of bank
failures and research objective. Section 3 presents discus-
sion on the dataset, sample, and covariates. In Section 4,
we outline empirical methods and discuss our results.
Sections 5 presents additional analysis and robustness
test. Section 6 concludes this study.
2 | LITERATURE REVIEW AND
RESEARCH OBJECTIVE
This paper is guided by theoretical models and empirical
literature related to determinants and prediction of bank
failures. In theory, two views explain the sources of bank
defaults. First is the panic-based view introduced by Bry-
ant (1980), which posits that banks are inherently vulner-
able and are subjected to contagion (Calomiris, 2007).
According to this view, bank runs can be attributed to
the strong likelihood of depositors withdrawing their
funds because others will run, or due to ambiguous or
inaccurate information about the institution's health
(Diamond & Dybvig, 1983). In such circumstances, many
banks fail due to high withdrawal pressure and risk
spreading the adverse effects within the banking system,
including solvent banks. Second is the fundamental-
based view which considers banks to be inherently stable
and not vulnerable to panic. According to this view,
depositors withdraw their funds due to adverse funda-
mental changes in the economic conditions of banks (e.
g., large losses), leading to the failure of only weak and
fragile banks (Calomiris, 2007). The latter view supports
our paper, which aims to investigate bank default predic-
tors. We believe that the financial status of a bank gener-
ally governs current depositors' withdrawal decisions,
investors, and expected depositors. Thus, it is essential to
focus on the factors that determine the financial condi-
tion of banks, in order to assist interested parties in mak-
ing informed decisions.
The empirical literature on the determinants of bank
failures typically concentrates on the United States (US)
banks and thrifts (e.g., Berger et al., 2016; Cole &
White, 2012; Lane et al., 1986; Meyer & Pifer, 1970;
Schaeck, 2008; Thomson, 1992; Wheelock &
Wilson, 2000). Furthermore, the literature draws heavily
on accounting-based indicators and aims to construct
early warning models generally based on the Uniform
Financial Rating System, informally known as the
CAMELS ratings system, to identify distress institutions
prior to their failures (e.g., Cole & Gunther, 1995; Cole &
White, 2012; Kolari et al., 2002). Several studies supple-
ment the CAMELS proxies with some information about
audit quality (Jin, Kanagaretnam, & Lobo, 2011), or cor-
porate governance (ownership, management, and com-
pensation) (Berger et al., 2016). All of these studies show
that their models are significant and effective in
predicting bank failures. Also, several statistical (e.g., Dis-
criminant analysis, DA, Logit/Probit regression models)
and intelligence (e.g., Support Vector Machines, SVM,
Neural Networks) techniques have been used to analyse
and predict bank failures. Demyanyk and Hasan (2010)
provide a thorough review of these techniques and
related studies; we refer interested readers to this study
for more details.
The vast body of research focuses on bank failures
that occurred during either the saving and loan crisis
period of 1987–1992, or the 2008–2010 subprime lending
crisis period. Papers studying the failed banks during the
saving and loan crisis (e.g., Cole & Gunther, 1995;
DeYoung, 2003; Wheelock & Wilson, 2000) show that
banks with poor capitalization, extreme non-performing
loans, low earnings, and less liquidity were associated
with a higher probability of failure. Recently, several
studies analysed the determinants of bank failures in the
United States during the recent subprime lending crisis
(Berger et al., 2016; Cole & White, 2012; DeYoung &
Torna, 2013; Hong, Huang, & Wu, 2014; Imbierowicz &
Rauch, 2014; Ng & Roychowdhury, 2014). Cole and
White (2012) use the CAMELS indicators together with
measures of “traditional” banking activities, such as com-
mercial and residential loans, to explain the drivers of US
commercial bank failures that occurred between 2004
and 2008, and to predict 2009 failures. They find that
banks with less capital, bad asset quality, lower earnings,
less liquidity, and with higher loan allocations to con-
struction-and-development loans, commercial mortgages,
and multi-family mortgages, are more likely to fail.
DeYoung and Torna (2013) focus on “non-traditional”
banking activities with mainly noninterest income such
as stakeholder activities and Fee-for-Service income to
analyse the US bank failures from 2007 to 2009. They
find that stakeholder activities (e.g., investment banking,
insurance underwriting, proprietary trading, and venture
capital) increase the probability of bank failures only if
the bank was already suffering from financial distress,
whereas Fee-for-Service income (e.g., insurance sales,
loan servicing and securities brokerage) reduce the
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probability of bank failures during the crisis. Hong
et al. (2014) examine the links between US commercial
bank failures and Basel III liquidity risk measures, liquid-
ity coverage ratio (LCR), and net stable funding ratio
(NSFR). They report that both LCR and NSFR have lim-
ited effects on explaining bank failures. Testing the
impact of loan loss reserves on US bank failures, Ng and
Roychowdhury (2014) employ a Cox proportional-hazard
model and report that “add-backs” of loan loss reserves is
positively related to bank failures. Additionally,
Imbierowicz and Rauch (2014) investigate the impact of
liquidity risk and credit risk on probabilities of default in
US commercial banks. They document that these two
risk sources separately increase the likelihood of default,
but their joint effect can either aggravate or mitigate
default risk. More recently, Berger et al. (2016) analyse
the roles of corporate governance (ownership, manage-
ment, and compensation structures) in US commercial
bank failures. They find that banks with more
shareholdings of lower-level managers and non-CEO
higher-level managers are more likely to fail. However,
the shareholdings of CEOs do not increase the risk of
failure.
According to Berger and Bouwman (2013), the exis-
ting literature generally suffers from two respective limi-
tations. First, most studies cover a short period of time
(the span of one banking crisis) and do not pay attention
to the periods prior to and following the crisis (normal
times), or other banking crises. Second, a thorough analy-
sis of bank failures across size classes is largely ignored.
This suggests that the findings of studies reviewing the
saving and loans crisis consider small banks results, given
the domination of failures among small banks (Berger &
Bouwman, 2013). Thus, the primary objective of our
study is to empirically examine whether and how the fail-
ure predictors show a discrepancy among virtually all US
commercial bank failures in different size classes.
The existing literature indicates that bank size plays a
pivotal role in maintaining financial stability (e.g., Bhagat
et al., 2015; De Haan & Poghosyan, 2012; De Nicolo, 2000;
Demsetz & Strahan, 1997). Demsetz and Strahan (1997)
focus on US bank holding companies (BHCs) to analyse
the relationship between bank size and volatility in stock
prices as a measure of risk. They conclude that large
BHCs are better diversified, but they are not less risky
than small BHCs. Analyzing an international sample of
banks, including 419 BHCs in the US, De Nicolo (2000)
finds a positive relationship between bank size and vola-
tility in small to medium-sized BHCs and a negative rela-
tionship in large ones. Hakenes and Schnabel (2011)
analyse the relationship between bank size and risk-tak-
ing under the Basel II Capital Accord. They conclude that
large banks have an advantage over small banks to
choose between the Standardized and Internal Ratings
Based Approach which pushes small banks to take more
risk. Moreover, De Haan and Poghosyan (2012) report a
non-linear relationship between size and earnings volatil-
ity. They find that bank size is negatively related to earn-
ings volatility, but the relationship becomes positive
when a bank's total assets exceed $5 billion. Recently,
Bhagat et al. (2015) studied the size effect on the risk-tak-
ing of US based financial institutions, including commer-
cial banks, investment banks and life insurance
companies. They document a positive relationship
between bank size and risk in the pre-crisis period (2002–
2006) and the crisis period (2007–2009), but not in the
post-crisis period (2010–2012). Overall, these analyses
provide useful insights that contribute to the main objec-
tive we formulate in this paper.
To the best of our knowledge, only two papers can be
considered as closely related studies to our paper (Berger
& Bouwman, 2013 and Imbierowicz & Rauch, 2014). Ber-
ger and Bouwman (2013) examine the impact of capital
on bank performance (survival and market share) across
bank size classes (small, medium, and large), and how
this effect differs across banking crises, market crises,
and normal times between 1984 and 2010, in the United
States. They find that capital improves the performance
of medium and large banks only during banking crises
and helps to improve the performance of small banks
during banking crises, market crises, and normal times.
However, Berger and Bouwman's paper differs from ours
in many respects. First, their study is based on only one
of the six CAMELS components (capital), and ignores the
others, that may misclassify distressed banks (Cole &
White, 2012). Second, they use a development sample up
to 2010, while we extend our sample to cover the most
recent observation (i.e., up to 2016). Third, they split the
bank size classes into small banks (gross total assets, or
GTA, up to $1 billion), medium banks (GTA exceeding
$1 billion and up to $3 billion), and large banks (GTA
exceeding $3 billion), while we use a different and argu-
ably more accurate criteria to determine bank size.2 Spe-
cifically, in any given year t, banks corresponding to the
bottom 25 percentile of total assets are considered small
banks, the top 25 percentile are considered large banks,
and the rest are medium banks. Fourth, they exclude
banks that are below $25 million of total assets instead of
including all banks, as we do.
Finally, Imbierowicz and Rauch (2014) investigate
the relationship between liquidity risk and credit risk
in different bank size categories. They show that
liquidity risk is slightly larger for small and medium
sized banks. However, they have not focused on the
discrepancies in the determinants of bank failures
across size categories.
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3 | DATASET, SAMPLE AND
COVARIATES
The data used in our empirical analysis come from the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) database.
The FDIC collects financial information such as balance
sheets and income statements from the Consolidated
Reports of Condition and Income (Call Reports) submit-
ted by US financial institutions on a quarterly basis. In
line with several existing studies we focus only on com-
mercial banks to obtain a homogenous sample. We
exclude savings banks due to the discrepancy in direc-
tions between these banks and the commercial banks
(Cole & White, 2012). To construct financial variables,
we use the year end (fourth quarter) data from 1985 to
2016 for each bank in our sample.
3.1 | Defining bank failures
To identify commercial bank failures, we use the Failed
Bank list reported by the FDIC, which is widely used in
the existing literature (e.g., Berger et al., 2016; Liu &
Ngo, 2014). The list contains characteristics of failed
banks, including bank names, locations, acquiring insti-
tutions, and closing dates. The FDIC generally records a
bank as failed if it enters either “assistance transactions,”
which require restructuring and the charter survives, or
“outright failure,” in which a bank closes its operations
and the charter is terminated. The failure list in our sam-
ple contains 1,871 banks with 1,694 outright failures and
123 assistance transactions.
3.2 | Defining small, medium, and large
banks
The literature documents the importance of bank size
and the advantages generated by size heterogeneity (e.
g., Berger & Bouwman, 2009, 2013). However, there is
no formal definition that identifies bank size classes.
Thus, we use similar criteria that have applied by
Imbierowicz and Rauch (2014), which is based on the
percentile of bank's total assets in a given year to clas-
sify it as small, medium, or large. Specifically, we con-
sider banks corresponding to the bottom 25 percentile
of total assets as small banks, the top 25 percentile as
large banks, and the rest as medium banks. We per-
form this exercise on a yearly basis, as our size classifi-
cation is based on the relative assets size of respective
banks, which changes from 1 year to another due to
various reasons. This gives us a sample of 74,533
bank-year observations for small banks, 149,072 bank-
year observations for medium banks, and 74,520 bank-
year observations for large banks. This subsequently
leads to 8,260 small banks, 12,977 medium banks, and
7,210 large banks in our sample.3
3.3 | Sample description
Table 1 presents the annual failure rates of banks from
1985 to 2016. To observe any differences between size cat-
egories, we also report the annual failure rates of small,
medium, and large banks. The average failure rate of our
entire sample is around 0.54%. The average failure rate is
highest for small banks (0.67%), followed by large banks
(0.53%), and lowest for medium banks (0.47%). Further,
we see in Table 1 that the relationship between failure
rate and bank size is most likely negative, up until the
onset of the subprime lending crisis in 2008. This rela-
tionship turns out to be positive, specifically between
2008 and 2012. However, after the crisis period, it
becomes negative.
The failure rates of small banks experienced a signifi-
cant rise around the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s
and 1990s, followed by large banks, and were lowest for
medium banks. Yet the failure rates of large banks esca-
lated dramatically during the subprime lending crisis,
followed by medium banks, and were lowest for small
banks (see Figure 1). This transformation in the failure
rates may be attributed to the augmentation in bank size
associated with high risk-taking by these banks (due to
the moral hazard that the government will bail them out
in troubled times to stabilize the financial system and
avoid unfortunate consequences to the economy [Pais &
Stork, 2013]).
3.4 | Covariates
In this section, we discuss the rationale behind our
choice of dependent variable, followed by relevant discus-
sion on the explanatory and control variables employed
in this study (see Table A1 in the appendix).
3.4.1 | Dependent variable
One important focus of this study is the determination of
factors that associated to bank failures across different
size classes. Therefore, the dependent variable is binary
(fail/non-fail). As discussed in Section 3.1 and following
Liu and Ngo (2014), we consider all banks in the FDIC
failed list as failed banks if presented as either “assistance
transactions” or “outright failures”.
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TABLE 1 Failures rate of US banks
All banks Small banks Medium banks Large banks
Year Failures Total % failures Failures Total % failures Failures Total % failures Failures Total % failures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
1985 118 14,656 0.8051 54 3,664 1.4738 56 7,328 0.7642 8 3,664 0.2183
1986 142 14,468 0.9815 61 3,616 1.6869 63 7,235 0.8708 18 3,617 0.4977
1987 199 14,171 1.4043 107 3,542 3.0209 73 7,086 1.0302 19 3,543 0.5363
1988 276 13,626 2.0255 86 3,406 2.5250 113 6,813 1.6586 77 3,407 2.2601
1989 204 13,074 1.5603 80 3,268 2.4480 82 6,538 1.2542 42 3,268 1.2852
1990 158 12,643 1.2497 70 3,161 2.2145 67 6,321 1.0600 21 3,161 0.6643
1991 103 12,258 0.8403 34 3,063 1.1100 46 6,132 0.7502 23 3,063 0.7509
1992 75 11,796 0.6358 26 2,948 0.8820 35 5,898 0.5934 14 2,950 0.4746
1993 38 11,303 0.3362 13 2,826 0.4600 17 5,651 0.3008 8 2,826 0.2831
1994 11 10,820 0.1017 3 2,705 0.1109 3 5,410 0.0555 5 2,705 0.1848
1995 5 10,271 0.0487 1 2,567 0.0390 1 5,137 0.0195 3 2,567 0.1169
1996 4 9,897 0.0404 1 2,474 0.0404 3 4,949 0.0606 0 2,474 0.0000
1997 1 9,562 0.0105 1 2,391 0.0418 0 4,781 0.0000 0 2,390 0.0000
1998 3 9,131 0.0329 1 2,283 0.0438 1 4,566 0.0219 1 2,282 0.0438
1999 6 8,838 0.0679 3 2,210 0.1357 2 4,419 0.0453 1 2,209 0.0453
2000 6 8,597 0.0698 2 2,150 0.0930 4 4,298 0.0931 0 2,149 0.0000
2001 3 8,284 0.0362 3 2,071 0.1449 0 4,142 0.0000 0 2,071 0.0000
2002 10 8,035 0.1245 4 2,009 0.1991 3 4,018 0.0747 3 2,008 0.1494
2003 1 7,896 0.0127 1 1,975 0.0506 0 3,948 0.0000 0 1,973 0.0000
2004 3 7,760 0.0387 1 1,941 0.0515 2 3,879 0.0516 0 1,940 0.0000
2005 0 7,671 0.0000 0 1,918 0.0000 0 3,836 0.0000 0 1,917 0.0000
2006 0 7,568 0.0000 0 1,892 0.0000 0 3,784 0.0000 0 1,892 0.0000
2007 1 7,444 0.0134 0 1,861 0.0000 1 3,722 0.0269 0 1,861 0.0000
2008 22 7,238 0.3040 4 1,810 0.2210 5 3,619 0.1382 13 1,809 0.7186
2009 124 7,018 1.7669 11 1,755 0.6268 57 3,509 1.6244 56 1,754 3.1927
2010 130 6,765 1.9217 19 1,692 1.1229 55 3,383 1.6258 56 1,690 3.3136
2011 84 6,443 1.3037 9 1,611 0.5587 51 3,222 1.5829 24 1,610 1.4907
2012 40 6,235 0.6415 8 1,559 0.5131 26 3,118 0.8339 6 1,558 0.3851


















3.4.2 | Explanatory variables
To develop our multivariate regression models, we con-
sider a broad list of 61 financial (accounting-based)
variables as candidate failure predictors, and briefly
explain them in the Table A1. These predictive vari-
ables are drawn from popular studies on bank failures,
including Wheelock and Wilson (2000), Kolari
et al. (2002), Arena (2008), Cole and White (2012),
DeYoung and Torna (2013), Betz, Oprica, Peltonen,
and Sarlin (2014), and many others.4 We do not con-
sider market-based covariates for two reasons. First,
the vast majority of our sample comprises unlisted
banks. Second, our prediction horizon is 1 to 3 years
prior to failure, while the signals of these variables
tend to have a shorter-run time horizon (Betz
et al., 2014). Moreover, Cole and Wu (2009) suggest
that bank-specific variables are more essential than
market and macroeconomic variables when predicting
bank failures. Our choice of variables reflects all
dimensions in the CAMELS categories, as well as
funding, business model, leverage, off-balance sheet,
growth, non-traditional activities, and others.5
Capital adequacy
Capital is the most important indicator that is considered
in all regulator and supervisor frameworks (e.g., Basel) to
ensure the safety and soundness of banks and financial
systems. It is also included as a key variable in virtually
all previous studies. The level of capital reflects the
capacity of banks to meet their financial obligations.
Hence, a decline in capital is a clear sign of potential
financial troubles. To measure the capital adequacy we
use the total equity to total assets (TETA) ratio, which is
largely used in the literature and a highly valuable proxy
of capital, and the nonperforming assets coverage ratio
(NPACR), which is shown by Chernykh and Cole (2015)
to outperform regulatory capital ratios in predicting US
bank failures. Higher values of these indicators are
expected to reduce the probability of bank failures. Fol-
lowing Poghosyan and Čihak (2011), we do not incorpo-
rate the ratio of regulatory capital to total risk-weighted
assets to avoid any risk assessment, and because the cal-
culation of these ratios is based on relatively arbitrary
weights.
Asset quality
poor quality of assets generally increases the probability
of bank failures. The most preponderant and risky assets
of commercial banks are loans. Thus, we focus heavily on
this asset group and employ a wide variety of potential
indicators, specifically loan loss reserves, loan loss provi-
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loans. In general, these variables are expected to have a
positive relationship with bank failures probability.
Management
Management competence plays a central role in the
performance and success of a bank. Although the
management quality is difficult to measure with
financial data, DeYoung (1998) documents that cost
efficiency reflects management quality. He concludes
that higher management quality leads to higher effi-
ciency of resource uses, thus we use the cost effi-
ciency represented by cost-to-income ratio to gauge
the quality of management. Following DeYoung and
Torna (2013) we also use cost inefficiency, measured
by total noninterest expenses to total assets. These
indicators are expected to be positively associated with
bank failures.
Earnings
This category reflects the profitability and performance
of banks. The most frequently applied measures are
return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), and
net interest margin (NIM). Higher earnings enhance
the profitability (ROA, ROE, NIM) and capital level
(equity/assets) that lead to improved bank perfor-
mance. Hence, the relationship between profitability
and the probability of bank failures is expected to be
negative.
Liquidity
An adequate liquidity is essential for banks to meet
their current obligations and to cope with unexpected
withdrawals of depositors without liquidating assets.
To gauge this category, we employ most of the vari-
ables that have been used in the literature, including
federal funds to total assets, securities to total assets,
total loans to total deposits, and others (see Table A1).
In general, we expect a higher value of these ratios to
have a negative relationship with bank failures
probability.
Sensitivity to market risk
This category is represented by the share of trading
income (TIOI). Higher trading income could be associ-
ated with a riskier business model and higher probability
of failing. Liquid, however, rather than loans, is more
likely to decrease fire sale losses. Thus, it is difficult to
predict the direction of the influence in advance.
In addition to the CAMELS covariates, we also
include many other potential explanatory variables, spe-
cifically to measure funding, business model, leverage,
off balance sheet, growth, non-traditional activities, and
others (see Table A1).
3.4.3 | Control variables
To establish the robustness of our explanatory variables,
we also report our multivariate results, supplementing
the following control variables:
Primary regulator
US commercial banks are regulated by one of three fed-
eral regulators. National banks are regulated by the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), state-chartered
banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System
(FRS) are regulated by the Federal Reserve, and state-
chartered banks that are not members of the FRS are reg-
ulated by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC). To investigate the influence of the regulator on
bank failures, we include three dummies: OCC, FED,
and FDIC. Due to collinearity, we use only two of them
(FED and FDIC), and treat OCC as the reference
category.
Foreign ownership
Foreign ownership is captured by a dummy variable that
takes the value of 1 if 25% or more of a bank is foreign-
owned, and 0 otherwise. Arena (2008) concludes that for-
eign banks in emerging countries can mitigate their prob-





















































































































































Bank Failures by Size
Small Banks Medium Banks Large Banks
FIGURE 1 This figure shows
the failure rate (in %) across bank
size categories that occurred during
our sample period from 1985 until
2016 [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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practices, capitalization, and access to parent funding,
however in the United States, Berger, DeYoung, Genay,
and Udell (2000) find that domestic banks are generally
more efficient than foreign banks. We therefore expect a
positive relationship between foreign ownership and the
probability of failure.
Growth of house prices index
This economic variable is a broad measure to capture real
estate prices at state-level. The movements of the real
estate prices can impair the stability of banks because
defaulted mortgage loans are generally covered by real
estate as collaterals, and banks will not be able to recover
all of the value of collaterals in a situation of deteriorat-
ing real estate prices. To capture the effect of this vari-
able, we obtain the seasonally adjusted house price
indices (HPIs) from the Federal Housing Finance
Agency. Following Berger and Bouwman (2013) we use
all transactions index (based on purchases and
appraisals) data until 1990 and purchase only index
(based on purchases) data from 1991 onward.
Banking crises
To measure the effects of previous banking crises, we cre-
ate two dummy variables. First, the saving and loans cri-
sis that takes the value of 1 for the years from 1987 to
1990, and 0 otherwise. Second, the subprime lending cri-
sis takes the value of 1 for the years from 2008 to 2010,
and 0 otherwise.
4 | ECONOMETRIC METHOD AND
ANALYSIS
This section discusses the statistical technique employed
in this study followed by multivariate model building
strategy.6 Subsequently it presents our empirical results
and analysis.
4.1 | Panel logistic regression
Numerous statistical methodologies have been used to
analyse and predict bank failures. These methods range
from simple Discriminant Analysis (e.g., Haslem,
Scheraga, & Bedingfield, 1992) and Logit/Probit regres-
sions (e.g., Berger et al., 2016) to advanced machine
learning techniques, such as Extreme Gradient Boosting
(e.g., Climent, Momparler, & Carmona, 2019). To investi-
gate the factors that associated with bank failures and
establish our empirical validation, we use panel logistic
regression with random effects. Although hazard models
are emerging as a popular choice (e.g., Cole & Wu, 2009;
Ng & Roychowdhury, 2014), Gupta et al. (2018) argue
that the discrete-time hazard model with logit link is
essentially a panel logistic model that controls for firms'
age. Accordingly, we assume that the marginal probabil-
ity of bank failures over the next time period follows a
logistic distribution that is estimated as follows:
P Y it =1ð Þ=
1
1+ exp −α−βX i,t−1ð Þ
, ð1Þ
where χit is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the
bank is failed in time t, and χi,t−1 is a vector of explana-
tory variables known at the end of the previous (or any
appropriate lagged) period.
4.2 | Variable selection method
Although previous studies have introduced numerous
variables to enhance the prediction accuracy of bank fail-
ure models, however which variables should be selected
to predict failures in relative terms is inconclusive. The
choice of variables is often driven by the popularity and/
or significance of certain indicators across the literature.
However, this is associated with the high risk of omitting
unsuccessful variables in the past, which could be influ-
ential when confronted with new data. Thus, the selec-
tion of variables is useful to identify relevant variables
and to enhance predictability (Tian, Yu, & Guo, 2015).
Stepwise selection is a commonly used traditional vari-
able selection approach that allows changes in either
direction, dropping or adding one variable at a time
according to some test statistics (Tian et al., 2015). How-
ever, it has a potential drawback. It ignores stochastic
errors in the variable selection process (Fan & Li, 2001).
Consequently, we rely on univariate regression analy-
sis for the selection of variables from a comprehensive list
of 61 variables considered in the literature (see Table A1).
Following Gupta et al. (2018), we perform univariate
regression analysis of each of the 61 variables in turn,
using the failure definition and econometric specification
discussed earlier. To gauge the intertemporal discrimina-
tory power of respective covariates we report regression
estimates for 1-year (T – 1), 2-years (T – 2), and 3-years
(T – 3) lagged time periods. To narrow down this list for
further multivariate analysis, we exclude variables that
(a) are not significant in all three time periods (to ensure
that the selected covariates are consistent predictors of
banks' financial soundness over a sufficiently long-time
interval to allow for developing a reasonable early warn-
ing system), and (b) exhibit AMEs of less than 5% in t−1
time period. The rationale is that a unit change in the
value of significant variables must induce sufficient
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change in the magnitude of the outcome probability to
clearly distinguish between failed and non-failed banks
(Gupta et al., 2018).
Most considered variables are statistically significant
at the 1, 5, or 10% significance levels across all lagged
time periods (see Table 2). However, only 19 out of 61
variables have AME values of 5% or more in t−1 time
period. This suggests that, although these variables are
significant predictors, a unit change in their value does
not transmit significant change in the probability of out-
come variable. Table 2 reports the final list of explanatory
variables that we use for further multivariate regression
analysis among all banks. An interesting observation in
Table 2 is that the variable with the highest AME, net
charge off to total assets (NCOTA), is largely ignored in
the literature. Furthermore, the aggregated non-per-
forming loans to total assets (NPLTA) ratio, which is con-
sidered to be one of the most common default predictors
in the literature, has lower AME than one of its compo-
nents (PD90TA) for the 1- and 2-years lagged periods, but
higher AME for the 3-years lagged period. This indicates
that the aggregated non-performing loans to total assets
(NPLTA) is a superior predictor for bank failure in the
longer time horizon (3 years and above).
We rerun the univariate regression analysis of each
variable (total 61 variables) to verify its power to explain
the failure of small, medium, and large banks respec-
tively. Specifically, we verify whether the statistical signif-
icance of variables vary across size categories or not.
Most of the considered variables are statistically signifi-
cant at the 1, 5, or 10% significance levels in explaining
the failure of small, medium, and large sized banks (see
Table 3). Subsequently, we repeat the elimination process
performed above using different bank size classifications
(small, medium, and large). We find relatively similar
results of univariate regression analysis compared with
all banks, but different AME and their ranking, as well as
additional variables across size categories. The final lists
contain 19, 20, and 21 variables for small, medium, and
large banks respectively. All of the 19 variables that we
report as significant and that have AME of 5% or more in
t−1time period for all banks (see Table 3) are the same
across size categories, except the ratio total deposits to
total assets (TDTA), which is rejected among large banks.
Furthermore, we find additional variables such as NIM
that meet the criteria for medium and large banks.
Table 3 reports the final list of variables that we use for
further multivariate regression analysis for small,
medium, and large banks.
A noteworthy observation in Table 3 is that the AMEs
of small banks' variables are mostly the highest for the 1-
year lagged estimate. However, the ranking is changed
for the second- and third-year lagged periods. The
variables of large banks have the highest AMEs. This
implies that the variables of small banks tend to have a
strong prediction on a shorter horizon, while the vari-
ables of large banks tend to have a stronger prediction
power in the longer horizon. Overall, these findings
strongly support our belief that the magnitudes (AMEs)
of mutually significant factors explaining bank failures
vary across small, medium, and large size categories.
4.3 | Multivariate model-building
strategy
Although several studies attempted to develop a parsimo-
nious model that is numerically stable and applicable,
they lack consensus on the criteria for including a vari-
able in the multivariate model. According to Hosmer,
Lemeshow, and Sturdivant (2013), the SE of a multivari-
ate regression model increases with the number of vari-
ables and makes the model more dependent on the
observed data. Thus, we use the approach suggested by
Gupta et al. (2018) to minimize the number of explana-
tory variables entering the multivariate models. This
approach requires the ranking of variables in univariate
regression (reported in Tables 2 and 3) based on the mag-
nitude of their AME (the variable with the highest value
of AME for 1-year lagged (t –1) is ranked 1, and so on),
and then each variable is introduced in turn into the mul-
tivariate model in declining order of their respective
AME. Gupta et al. (2018) justify that the higher the value
of AME, the higher the change in the predicted probabil-
ity due to unit changes in the variable's value. In addi-
tion, a variable with a higher value of AME (e.g., NCOTA
in Table 2) is more efficient than a variable with a lower
value of AME (e.g., NIETA in Table 2) in discriminating
between failed and non-failed banks. Thus, a covariate
with a higher AME should have a priority entry in the
multivariate prediction model. We also exclude a variable
from the multivariate models if, when added it (a)
changes the sign of any previously added variable, (b)
holds the opposite sign to that generated by univariate
analysis, (c) holds the identical sign to univariate analy-
sis, but is insignificant with a p-value greater than 0.10,
and (d) makes a previously introduced variable insignifi-
cant with a p-value greater than 0.10. This screening
mechanism ensures that the method is useful to appro-
priately address the issue of multicollinearity, and gives a
parsimonious multivariate model. Using panel logistic
regression, this process is applied to all, small, medium,
and large banks respectively for all three (T – 1, T – 2,
and T – 3) respective lagged time periods. We do this to
observe any variances that may arise due to different esti-
mation models across different size classes.
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We eventually end up with six variables to be used in
the multivariate model for all banks. The variables are
net charge off (NCOTA), past due 90+ days (PD90TA),
loan loss reserves (LLRTA), total equity (TETA), other
real estate owned (OREOTA), and total of non-interest
expense (NIETA), and they are expressed as a ratio with
respect to the bank's total assets. For small banks, the
multivariate regression model is explained by seven vari-
ables. Five out of the seven variables (NCOTA, PD90TA,
LLRTA, OREOTA, and NIETA) are common to explana-
tory variables for all banks. The other two variables are
total deposits to total assets ratio (TDTA) and total inter-
est expenses to total liabilities (TIETLB). Among large
banks, five variables (PD90TA, LLRTA, TETA, NIM, and
Loan Loss Provisions to Total Loans, LLPTL) are
included in the multivariate regression model. Only three
variables (PD90TA, LLRTA, and TETA) are similar to the
variables of all banks. For medium banks, the multivari-
ate regression model contains six variables as a combina-
tion of the explanatory variables for small and large
banks (NCOTA, PD90TA, LLRTA, TETA, OREOTA,
and NIM).
To further evaluate the consistency and strength of
respective sets of main variables in jointly predicting the
probability of banks' failures, we estimate another set of
multivariate models supplementing control variables
(discussed in Section 3.4.3). This helps us to control for
potential differences in bank stability, banking crises,
and state-level economic conditions. To gauge their inter-
temporal predictive ability, we also estimate regression
models for 2- and 3-years lagged periods. The models and
their results are presented in Tables 4–6.
4.4 | Multivariate regression results and
discussion
4.4.1 | All banks
The results in columns 2, 3 and 4 of Table 4 indicate that
the coefficients on NCOTA, PD90TA, LLRTA, and
OREOTA have a positive influence on the probability of
failure, implying that a weaker asset quality is associated
with a higher bank failure. This is consistent with
Imbierowicz and Rauch (2014), who find that credit risk
has a prominent role in the overall stability of a bank.
The coefficient on NIETA is positively related to bank
failures. This suggests that a high level of bank operating
expenses increases the likelihood of failure. This is in line
with the findings of DeYoung (1998) who shows that
poor management reduces the efficiency of using
resources, thereby increasing the probability of default.
In contrast, the coefficient on TETA is negative,
suggesting that a higher capital is associated with a lower
probability of failure. This is intuitive as the capital serves
as a main line of defence against bank failures (Berger &
Bouwman, 2013). All of these results are supported by
several studies within the theoretical literature (e.g., Bry-
ant, 1980; Repullo, 2004).
Turning to the control variables, house price inflation
shows significantly negative values for all three lagged
periods. This implies that declining real estate prices
increase the probability of bank failures. This result is
similar to the findings of Berger et al. (2016) who report
that house price inflation has a negative effect, mostly on
the 2 years preceding the failure. In contrast, foreign
ownership is positively related to bank failures,
suggesting that banks are more likely to fail if they have
a greater percentage of foreign ownership. This result is
in line with the findings of Berger et al. (2000) who show
that foreign banks are generally less efficient than domes-
tic banks in the US. The banking crises (SL and GFC)
and primary regulator (FED and FDIC) dummies have
significant and positive values for all lagged periods.
Overall, the baseline model is parsimonious and offers a
good model that fits the data. This is illustrated by, for
example, the McKelvey and Zavoina pseudo R-squared,
which is 77%. This value outperforms similar models in
the early warning system literature (e.g., Cole &
White, 2012; Poghosyan & Čihak, 2011). Additionally,
the results of area under ROC (AUROC) curves of multi-
variate model for all banks, as shown in Appendix A1,
exhibit that our models are excellent (around or above
90%) in classifying within-sample bank failures across all
lagged time periods. However, AUROC values of the
hold-out sample vary across different forecast horizons.
The lowest estimate is 73% for the 3 years prior to the
forecasting horizon, which is considered to be acceptable,
while the 1- and 2-year forecast horizons are above 91%,
suggesting excellent classification performance of our
multivariate models.
4.4.2 | Small banks
Table 5 (columns 3, 7 and 11) reports the results of the
main variables of multivariate regression models for
small banks. NCOTA, PD90TA, LLRTA, OREOTA, and
NIETA are identical to the multivariate regression
models for all banks, are statistically significant, and have
signs consistent with univariate regression estimates
reported earlier. The other two variables are total
deposits to total assets ratio (TDTA) as a measure of
funding, and total interest expenses to total liabilities
(TIETLB) as a proxy of liquidity. The coefficient on
TDTA is significantly positive, suggesting that higher
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TABLE 2 Univariate regression analysis of all banks
Variable 1 year lag 2 years lag 3 years lag Rank
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
TETA 5
β −118.0046a −78.3307a −26.8250a
SE 1.958 1.991 1.437
AME% −52.21a −12.44a −1.40a
NPACR 13
β −61.8227a −59.8196a −32.0309a
SE 1.4194 1.5158 0.9211
AME% −23.19a −10.53a −1.92a
LLRTA 4
β 226.1444a 202.4610a 132.0195a
SE 4.5209 4.2604 4.7299
AME% 58.06a 21.11a 2.60a
PD90TA 2
β 132.8156a 128.1063a 107.1189a
SE 2.5497 3.4981 4.8608
AME% 68.22a 19.31a 2.35a
NAATA 9
β 93.0304a 95.5749a 64.8830a
SE 1.7678 2.0556 1.8676
AME% 35.26a 9.25a 4.31a
OREOTA 12
β 133.7940a 130.1982a 77.7526a
SE 3.0969 2.7788 2.4406
AME% 28.78a 8.81a 5.08a
NPATA 15
β 61.4833a 68.4851a 43.4345a
SE 1.3492 1.6684 1.0674
AME% 21.43a 9.11a 2.92a
LLPTL 14
β 58.7813a 54.5288a 36.4989a
SE 0.9237 1.2300 1.3511
AME% 22.87a 7.97a 2.96a
LLPTA 3
β 120.3485a 115.2256a 93.5506a
SE 1.5309 2.2250 2.9432
AME% 62.07a 29.44a 2.67a
NPLTL 17
β 44.6085a 41.7751a 26.9399a
SE 0.8300 0.9684 0.8418
AME% 14.73a 4.82a 1.95a
NPLTA 8
β 77.9467a 79.7153a 59.6845a
(Continues)
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deposits are associated with a higher probability of fail-
ure. This is consistent with Acharya and Naqvi (2012)
who theoretically show that banks with excessive
deposits are more likely to take risks by mitigating the
lending standards to increase loans, because managers
compensations are based on the volume of loans. It is
TABLE 2 (Continued)
Variable 1 year lag 2 years lag 3 years lag Rank
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
SE 1.2544 1.7377 1.6073
AME% 35.36a 14.33a 5.01a
NCOTA 1
β 142.3555a 130.1408a 91.1873a
SE 1.9951 2.8493 3.0657
AME% 68.69a 20.40a 7.06a
NCOTL 10
β 78.7936a 69.5501a 45.6649a
SE 1.2693 1.7141 1.7668
AME% 34.64a 8.03a 3.22a
ROA 7
β −95.7321a −76.4859a −58.5776a
SE 1.1160 1.5979 1.8411
AME% −48.40a −32.34a −3.70a
TIETLB 16
β 50.5999a 45.5311a 33.0639a
SE 1.6673 1.8924 2.2087
AME% 15.80a 5.70a 0.70a
TDTA 11
β 52.3850a 15.0219a 3.7117a
SE 1.0468 0.7647 0.5178
AME% 30.77a 1.51a 0.20a
TLBTA 6
β 117.2084a 77.9171a 26.8385a
SE 1.9600 2.0430 1.4386
AME% 51.65a 12.67a 1.42a
DIR 18
β 47.7084a 44.6106a 34.7815a
SE 1.5661 1.8040 2.1400
AME% 14.31a 5.42a 0.76a
NIETA 19
β 78.0376a 53.8628a 32.1676a
SE 2.0561 2.0986 2.1687
AME% 13.32a 3.70a 2.51a
Notes: a (b) [c] significant at the 1% (5%) [10%] level (two-sided test). The table reports univariate panel logistic regression results of final set
of variables that we use for multivariate logit regression analysis. This excludes variables that are not significant in all three time periods or
are significant but exhibit average marginal effects (AME) of less than 5% in all three time periods. β is the regression coefficient, SE is stan-
dard error and AME is average marginal effects in percentage. Ranking is based on the absolute values of AME for the 1-year lagged time
estimate, where the highest value gets 1, second highest get 2 and so on.
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TABLE 3 Univariate regression analysis by size categories



















banks SB MB LB
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
TETA 6 5 1
β −104.5323a −130.1084a −120.8708a −79.3857a −100.3526a −62.2437a −27.4832a −35.8680a −22.1070a
SE 3.2361 4.2753 3.1002 3.3538 3.6284 2.9461 2.4525 2.4180 2.9787
AME% −62.18a −44.10a −54.59a −10.96a −4.08a −34.83a −0.45a −1.11a −3.94a
NPACR 13 12 16
β −57.2967a −68.9085a −53.1749a −54.6331a −72.6386a −46.1104a −30.8899a −47.1803a −28.4403a
SE 2.2476 2.9380 2.0797 2.1369 2.1867 2.1660 1.6521 2.0623 1.7933
AME% −29.20a −21.26a −20.61a −13.27a −7.71a −14.17a −1.06a −0.15a −6.58a
LLRTA 5 4 5
β 213.0666a 240.7152a 231.7835a 198.8182a 286.6373a 176.7561a 141.3965a 173.0129a 78.7335a
SE 8.0482 7.3646 10.1898 8.0616 8.4806 10.0358 8.7002 9.7912 10.1420
AME% 63.01a 48.09a 47.76a 22.69a 6.29a 15.84a 4.50a 0.50a 4.56a
PD90TA 10 3 3
β 133.9768a 139.6740a 117.3466a 128.8366a 140.7921a 104.5770a 113.9995a 117.5897a 92.9058a
SE 4.9223 4.1417 6.7189 6.2654 5.6501 8.0909 7.2826 7.7970 10.1162
AME% 43.65a 50.76a 51.97a 18.07a 11.99a 29.47a 7.59a 1.21a 12.05a
NAATA 11 10 9
β 87.7152a 98.6135a 89.9165a 91.2369a 106.0918a 90.1672a 60.6484a 85.2727a 65.1436a
SE 2.8367 3.0422 3.5646 3.5265 3.0938 4.1568 3.5138 3.7726 4.1951
AME% 43.59a 28.57a 36.72a 6.58a 4.89a 15.74a 2.88a 0.50a 4.66a
OREOTA 12 13 11
β 122.6557a 148.6665a 128.2099a 108.5423a 148.4729a 100.4943a 88.4473a 100.6918a 64.8086a
SE 5.8518 4.2552 6.1331 4.1746 4.2838 5.5546 4.4715 5.2020 5.7444
AME% 28.78a 20.01 a 27.70a 14.76a 4.83a 15.47a 4.21a 0.69a 5.60a
NPATA 14 15 18
β 57.5061a 63.4320a 59.719a 67.9820a 73.0869a 58.4588a 45.2425a 58.9372a 40.8855a
SE 2.0917 2.2385 3.1924 2.5115 2.0663 2.7041 2.0632 2.2254 2.4771






































banks SB MB LB
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
LLPTL 15 14 15
β 50.3822a 62.6381a 71.1554a 52.4631a 59.8731a 58.3550a 36.1935a 43.3581a 32.1781a
SE 1.4754 1.5675 2.5860 2.1884 1.9814 2.8988 2.2964 2.5763 3.2276
AME% 24.71a 18.93a 21.14a 3.94a 4.69a 10.59a 1.87a 0.44a 3.16a
LLPTA 2 2 4
β 111.6439a 125.6934a 130.3305a 112.8078a 123.4805a 117.4030a 92.0200a 93.5506a 93.5506a
SE 2.3703 2.1606 4.2779 3.9636 3.7424 5.2697 4.5473 2.9432 2.9432
AME% 81.30a 56.30a 48.55a 29.72a 21.26a 24.12a 7.86a 2.67a 2.67a
NPLTL 17 16 19
β 37.7979a 48.1177a 52.6437a 33.6181a 47.8420a 43.2023a 24.2412a 36.2740a 27.6767a
SE 1.2911 1.4320 2.3153 1.3998 1.4320 2.0705 1.4766 1.7402 1.9735
AME% 14.77a 11.87a 14.32a 5.50a 2.50a 7.06a 1.19a 0.22a 2.17a
NPLTA 9 9 10
β 72.1163a 81.9581a 80.1566a 76.6422a 88.3124a 77.8734a 59.0820a 78.4115a 57.4972a
SE 2.0370 2.1214 3.1803 3.2444 2.7119 3.5575 2.8788 3.1037 3.5359
AME% 46.56a 30.02a 31.61a 15.90a 8.81a 15.62a 4.63a 0.75a 5.26a
NCOTA 1 1 6
β 134.5371a 145.7577a 156.7221a 128.4773a 143.0513a 126.1068a 97.0111a 108.7911a 75.2839a
SE 2.8553 3.2351 5.8626 4.9892 4.5495 6.4348 5.3360 5.7823 7.4377
AME% 96.88a 63.92a 47.15a 21.35a 11.32a 20.64a 5.72a 0.93a 6.36a
NCOTL 8 11 12
β 71.0714a 84.7499a 91.1711a 68.6089a 77.1802a 69.2162a 47.4138a 53.2410a 39.9651a
SE 1.5848 2.3689 3.4579 2.8728 2.6383 3.6113 2.9994 3.3405 4.3282
AME% 53.11a 24.72a 26.30a 5.60a 3.43a 12.30a 2.38a 0.35a 3.70a
ROA 4 7 7
β −86.9303a −102.0375a −103.9933a −82.1382a −78.7770a −91.1763a −76.9376a −56.2362a −53.4303a
SE 1.9747 1.7691 2.3017 3.2715 2.5243 4.1054 3.7828 2.8210 4.2183





































banks SB MB LB
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
TIETLB 18 19 14
β 61.4023a 47.7399a 40.9523a 57.8087a 44.3314a 39.8235a 36.4754a 36.8810a 41.0876a
SE 3.1827 2.5850 3.1309 3.6377 2.9744 3.3368 4.0068 3.4618 3.7925
AME% 14.07a 6.76a 22.92a 6.90a 1.98a 14.84a 1.70a 0.37a 7.04a
TDTA 3 8
β 93.2730a 73.8422a 46.6249a 24.8628a 14.1678a 6.6342a
SE 2.6247 1.8049 2.4809 1.5792 1.7131 1.0472
AME% 65.22a 35.73a 3.34a 0.69a 0.66a 0.03a
TLBTA 7 6 2
β 104.0208a 129.7856a 118.6901a 79.5195a 91.3966a 61.8247a 26.9838a 35.8971a 22.1775a
SE 3.2385 4.3062 3.0341 3.2817 2.9565 2.9201 2.4658 2.4175 2.9764
AME% 61.66a 43.66a 53.71a 9.85a 8.57a 34.59a 0.66a 1.10a 3.99a
DIR 19 18 17
β 57.6155a 46.8472a 36.4952a 55.6349a 44.4691a 37.9377a 33.6129a 38.6343a 43.0988a
SE 2.9947 2.4835 2.7541 3.4871 2.8618 3.0714 3.8476 3.3762 3.6524
AME% 12.90a 7.09a 20.42a 6.59a 2.26a 13.28a 1.43a 0.41a 6.87a
NIETA 16 17
β 93.6376a 92.4090a 75.5076a 52.9018a 63.1194a 26.8552a
SE 4.1514 3.3347 3.5111 3.3639 3.8580 4.1414
AME% 15.86a 7.23a 8.31a 1.79a 3.84a 0.24a
NIM 20 8
β −109.2913a −108.9558a −64.2987a −72.3164a −24.8567a −34.0273a
SE 8.0180 10.1674 7.3971 9.6534 7.4900 8.9746
AME% −6.11a −38.72a −2.79a −24.13a −0.75a −9.27a
CDLTA 20
β 10.2700a 12.6876a 14.1905a
SE 0.5645 0.5577 0.5723






































banks SB MB LB
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
TSTA 21
β −10.3733a −9.9772a −10.3493a
SE 0.5779 0.6435 0.7304
AME% −6.01a −4.79a −2.86a
NIITA 13
β −128.8201a −90.1715a −39.4006a
SE 7.2345 7.4045 7.3900
AME% −24.09a −12.03a −3.10a
Notes: a (b) [c] significant at the 1% (5%) [10%] level (two-sided test). The table reports univariate panel logistic regression results of the final set of variables for 1-year (columns 2 to 4), 2-years
(columns 5 to 7), and 3-years (columns 8 to 10) lagged time periods across different size categories that we use for multivariate logit regression analysis. This excludes variables that are not sig-
nificant in all three time periods or are significant but exhibit Average Marginal Effects (AME) of less than 5% in all three time periods. The sampling period is between 1985–2016. We con-
sider banks corresponding to the bottom 25 percentile of total assets as small banks, those in the top 25 percentile as large banks, and the rest medium banks. If a bank fails in year t, the
bank's failure indicator is “1” in that year t and “0” otherwise. β is the regression coefficient, SE is standard error and AME is Average Marginal Effects in percentage. Ranking (columns 11 to
13) is based on the absolute values of AME for the 1-year lagged time estimate for small banks (SB), medium banks (MB), and large banks (LB), where the highest value gets 1, second highest

















TABLE 4 Multivariate regression model for all banks
Panel A: Regression results
Without control variables With control variables
Variable 1 year lag 2 years lag 3 years lag 1 year lag 2 years lag 3 years lags
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
NCOTA
β 39.8244a 35.8465a 29.6089a 19.3895a 22.7565a 22.8679a
SE 2.6997 3.6711 4.1561 3.4203 4.1896 5.4609
AME% 15.0422a 6.1886a 2.5228a 5.3925a 5.1108a 2.2872a
PD90TA
β 30.8333a 68.6989a 67.0855a 35.7708a 63.9088a 87.8005a
SE 3.6360 4.6782 4.7960 4.7021 5.5617 6.3381
AME% 11.6461a 11.8604a 5.7161a 9.9483a 14.3532a 8.7816a
LLRTA
β 38.7496a 90.7056a 41.4054a 45.3049a 66.7501a 35.3956a
SE 3.8866 5.8187 5.9059 4.8571 6.4110 7.4069
AME% 14.6362a 15.6597a 3.5280a 12.5999a 14.9913a 3.5401a
TETA
β −75.4119a −40.1401a −12.6109a −81.5346a −48.3109a −25.2473a
SE 2.2137 1.8575 1.2173 2.7717 2.4545 1.8338
AME% −28.4841a −6.9299a −1.0745a −22.6759a −10.8501a −2.5251a
OREOTA
β 25.6350a 56.5833a 47.0656a 11.9870a 32.9740a 33.8065a
SE 1.9345 3.0603 2.8371 2.2337 3.3489 3.5696
AME% 9.6827a 9.7687a 4.0103a 3.3337a 7.4056a 3.3812a
NIETA
β 3.4345c 3.5456 6.5127b 17.1175a 12.1606a 21.1530a
SE 1.8988 2.8338 2.8252 2.3013 2.8837 3.4003
AME% 1. 2972c 0.6121 0.5549b 4.7606a 2.7311a 2.1156a
GHPI
β −11.8082a −12.2518a −16.3320a
SE 0.7100 0.7338 0.8243
AME% −3.2840a −2.7516a −1.6334a
SL
β 2.3327a 2.7928a 2.2307a
SE 0.1377 0.1448 0.1479
AME% 0.6487a 0.6272a 0.2231a
GFC
β 1.7208a 2.4787a 3.5303a
SE 0.1319 0.1392 0.1290
AME% 0.4786a 0.5566a 0.3531a
FOPCT
β 2.7074a 3.1634a 3.2666a
SE 0.1368 0.14717 0.1289
AME% 0.7529a 0.7104a 0.3267a
(Continues)
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also consistent with a recent empirical paper by Khan,
Scheule, and Wu (2017) who find that banks holding
higher deposits generally take more risks. This risk-tak-
ing can be attributed to the moral hazard of deposit
insurance (Keeley, 1990). Moreover, we find the coeffi-
cient of TIETLB is significant and positively related to
bank failures, implying that a higher share of interest
expenses to total liabilities is associated with a higher
probability of failure. This is in line with the findings of
Betz et al. (2014) who show that the share of interest
expenses to total liabilities has a positive effect on bank
failures. These results are important to the literature in
two ways. First, the low funding risk, as proxied by
higher deposit ratios, has a more adverse effect on small
banks and participates heavily in their failures. Second,
the ratio of total interest expenses to total liabilities
(TIETLB) contributes to explaining the relationship
between liquidity risk and bank failures, specifically in
small banks.
Next, we complement the models estimated in Table 5
with control variables (see Table 6). We find that all
variables are statistically significant, and the sign of
respective coefficients remains the same as the multivari-
ate models estimated without control variables. An
exception is NCOTA, which is insignificant for the 3-
years lagged estimate. Furthermore, all control variables
are statistically significant, and have a sign consistent
with the control variables of the multivariate regression
model for all banks.
The within-sample area under ROC (AUROC) curves
of multivariate models developed across small banks are
above 91%, suggesting excellent classification perfor-
mance of our multivariate models for small banks across
all time periods. The AUROC for out-of-sample for the 1-
and 2-year horizons are excellent (above 83%), while that
for the 3-year horizon is acceptable with 73% (see Appen-
dix A1). These values and the shapes of ROC curves are
relatively similar to the values and shapes of the ROC
curves of all banks. This might indicate that small banks
dominate the sample. Therefore, the effects of medium
and large banks could be disregarded, thereby leading to
a heterogeneous sampling and biased estimates. This
TABLE 4 (Continued)
Panel A: Regression results
Without control variables With control variables
Variable 1 year lag 2 years lag 3 years lag 1 year lag 2 years lag 3 years lags
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
FDIC
β 2.8677a 2.4352a 1.4718a
SE 0.1399 0.1502 0.1426
AME% 0.7975a 0.5469a 0.1472a
FED
β 2.8925a 2.4565a 1.4033a
SE 0.1853 0.1925 0.1974
AME% 0.8044a 0.5517a 0.1403a
Panel B: Goodness of fit measures
Wald Chi2 2615a 1805a 1495a 1923a 1308a 1560a
Log likelihood −4,722 −6,698 −7,189 −3,230 −4,606 −4,683
R2 0.7569 0.3018 0.0810 0.7722 0.5131 0. 2,998
No. of “0” 276,981 258,270 240,317 257,801 239,877 223,809
No. of “1” 1,694 1,554 1,342 1,546 1,337 1,040
Notes: a (b) [c] significant at the 1% (5%) [10%] level (two-sided test). Panel A presents multivariate panel logistic regression results for 1-year,
2-years, and 3-years lagged periods, estimated over a sampling period of 1985–2016. Columns 2, 3 and 4 do not include control variables and
the rest include control variables in the multivariate estimates. If a bank fails in year t, the bank's binary indicator is “1” in that year t and
“0” otherwise. A positive coefficient (β) suggests a positive relationship with failure likelihood and vice-versa. SE is standard error of respec-
tive coefficients and AME is Average Marginal Effects in percentage. Panel B reports the chi-square, the likelihood ratio and the coefficient
of determination (McKelvey and Zavoina's R2) to measure the model's goodness of fit. No. of “1” counts the number of failures in our sam-
ple, while No. of “0” counts the number of “non-failure” observations.
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TABLE 5 Multivariate regression models without control variables by size categories
Panel A: Regression results
























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
NCOTA
β 39.8244a 47.7780a 26.7794a 35.8465a 35.2795a 24.3572b 29.6089a 34.9807a 18.6729c
SE 2.6997 4.3729 6.9356 3.6711 5.8198 9.7469 4.1561 7.7074 9.7194
AME% 15.0422a 25.9338a 8.2233a 6.1886a 9.2955a 2.4260b 2.5228a 2.3449a 0. 4449c
PD90TA
β 30.8333a 40.0387a 49.2210a 30.7840b 68.6989a 60.4810a 103.1499a 49.6830a 67.0855a 74.9498a 59.3297a 49.4819a
SE 3.6360 5.5941 9.7116 13.4527 4.6782 7.5487 12.4985 14.7570 4.7960 9.4391 12.5299 13.6310
AME% 11.6461a 21.7330a 15.1145a 14.3720b 11.8604a 15.9356a 10.2738a 17.2549a 5.7161a 5.0242a 1.4135a 21.8576a
LLRTA
β 38.7496a 37.2199a 76.9432a 90.8796a 90.7056a 80.8907a 151.7489a 111.7549a 41.4054a 48.9785a 89.8852a 51.0923a
SE 3.8866 6.2611 11.4386 13.0387 5.8187 9.6021 14.3551 16.0917 5.9059 12.0932 14.1703 15.1547
AME% 14.6362a 20.2029a 23.6273a 42.4285a 15.6597a 21.3132a 15.1143a 38.8126a 3.5280a 3.2832a 2.1416a 22.5689a
TETA
β −75.4119a −76.8456a −58.5020a −40.1401a −46.1721a −28.6889a −12.6109a −19.4217a −16.7651a
SE 2.2137 7.2994 5.3171 1.8575 4.4201 3.5789 1.2173 2.9238 2.9133
AME% −28.4841a −23.5974a −27.3126a −6.9299a −4.5988a −9.9637a −1.0745a −0. 4627a −7.4056a
OREOTA
β 25.6350a 30.3981a 29.5583a 56.5833a 50.6729a 58.6815a 47.0656a 56.9582a 50.5365a
SE 1.9345 2.9128 5.6556 3.0603 5.2876 7.1723 2.8371 6.1759 7.4430
AME% 9.6827a 16.5000a 9.0766a 9.7687a 13.3513a 5.8447a 4.0103a 3.8181a 1.2040a
NIETA
β 3.4345c 24.7046a 3.5456 50.8636a 6.5127b 56.7940a
SE 1.8988 3.2496 2.8338 5.1278 2.8252 5.8014
AME% 1. 2972c 13.4096a 0.6121 13.4016a 0.5549b 3.8071a
TDTA



















Panel A: Regression results
























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
SE 2.6588 2.0183 1.4217
AME% 21.8956a 4.0656a 0.4496a
TIETLB
β 6.4420c 25.9831a 10.8052b
SE 3.3363 4.4912 5.2393
AME% 3.4967c 6.8460a 0.7243c
NIM
β −69.8740a −61.2067a −90.6152a −77.2748a −42.6528a −37.2785a
SE 9.5580 9.3690 11.4190 10.8521 9.7505 8.6466
AME% −21.4566a −28.5753a −9.0253a −26.8376a −1.0162a −16.4670a
LLPTL
β 14.8423a 18.7471a 6.1916
SE 4.0385 4.9228 5.4214
AME% 6.9293a 6.5109a 2.7350
Panel B: Goodness of fit measures
Wald Chi2 2615a 1134a 184a 332a 1805a 473a 614a 199a 1495a 599a 336a 106a
Log likelihood −4,722 −1,561 −931 −580 −6,698 −1920 −1,691 −1,153 −7,189 −1859 −2043 −1,413
R2 0.7569 0.7765 0.6956 0.6850 0.3018 0.2818 0.2508 0.2723 0.0810 0.1003 0.0796 0.1141
No. of “0” 276,981 67,482 53,792 26,753 258,270 62,347 48,553 24,137 240,317 58,013 43,297 21,532
No. of “1” 1,694 573 347 198 1,554 515 398 256 1,342 403 403 276
Notes: a (b) [c] significant at the 1% (5%) [10%] level (two-sided test). Panel A presents multivariate panel logistic regression results without control variables for 1-year (columns 2 to 5), 2-years
(columns 6 to 9), and 3-years (columns 10 to 13) lagged periods across different size categories. The sampling period runs between 1985–2016. We consider banks corresponding to the bottom
25 percentile of total assets as small banks, those in the top 25 percentile as large banks, and the rest medium banks. If a bank fails in year t, the bank's failure indicator is “1” in that year t
and “0” otherwise. A positive coefficient (β) suggests a positive relationship with failure likelihood and vice-versa. SE is standard error of respective coefficients and AME is Average Marginal
Effects in percentage. Panel B reports the chi-square, the likelihood ratio and the coefficient of determination (McKelvey and Zavoina's R2) to measure the model's goodness of fit. No. of “1”

















TABLE 6 Multivariate regression models with control variables by size categories
Panel A: Regression results


























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
NCOTA
β 19.3895a 23.6037a 16.1267b 22.7565a 16.8937a 7.9462 22.8679a 9.4457 11.5266
SE 3.4203 5.9249 7.8013 4.1896 6.2052 7.1901 5.4609 6.9608 8.1313
AME% 5.3925a 8.3371a 5.0714b 5.1108a 6.3238a 4.8672 2.2872a 3.6989 8.1205
PD90TA
β 35.7708a 36.8391a 29.7863a 74.9467b 63.9088a 41.6546a 41.1333a 23.3172 87.8005a 49.0316a 50.1830a 25.9338
SE 4.7021 7.3648 11.5435 18.1738 5.5617 7.8294 9.5826 20.0476 6.3381 8.2395 10.4303 19.1263
AME% 9.9483a 13.0121a 9.3670a 30.3851a 14.3532a 15.5926a 25.1950a 9.5130 8.7816a 19.2007a 35.3538a 24.0660
LLRTA
β 45.3049a 55.4850a 74.4268a 48.0865a 66.7501a 63.1352a 75.4361a 109.3064a 35.3956a 32.9799a 52.4253a 58.7668a
SE 4.8571 7.9362 11.1310 14.5004 6.4110 8.6515 9.3138 21.5749 7.4069 9.1973 10.1822 14.3517
AME% 12.5999a 19.5980a 23.4054a 19.4953a 14.9913a 23.6334a 46.2061a 44.5949a 3.5401a 12.9149a 36.9335a 54.5342a
TETA
β −81.5346a −80.0039a −78.6671a −48.3109a −28.9044a −32.2108a −25.2473a −13.3598a −12.8896a
SE 2.7717 6.4577 5.8419 2.4545 2.9681 5.6366 1.8338 2.4391 3.1857
AME% −22.6759a −25.1593a −31.8934a −10.8501a −17.7045a −13.1414a −2.5251a −9.4119a −11.9612a
OREOTA
β 11.9870a 21.5538a 23.7403a 32.9740a 22.1463a 25.7580a 33.8065a 13.5405a 24.2017a
SE 2.2337 3.5277 4.8817 3.3489 3.9491 4.1493 3.5696 4.3868 4.9287
AME% 3.3337a 7.6131a 7.4657a 7.4056a 8.2900a 15.7773a 3.3812a 5.3024a 17.0500a
NIETA
β 17.1175a 41.0303a 12.1606a 44.0242a 21.1530a 43.3831a
SE 2.3013 3.8786 2.8837 4.6609 3.4003 4.8454
AME% 4.7606a 14.4924a 2.7311a 16.4796a 2.1156a 16.9887a
TDTA
β 35.1497a 12.6272a 5.0683a



















Panel A: Regression results


























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
AME% 12.4153a 4.7267a 1.9847a
TIETLB
β 56.1849a 61.8262a 71.8786a
SE 5.5543 5.5448 5.6244
AME% 19.8453a 23.1434a 28.1475a
NIM
β −31.9666a −8.4281 −56.3848a −77.9860a −35.9209a −26.9491a
SE 9.7895 11.9581 7.9308 14.1350 7.9246 9.1266
AME% −10.0527a −3.4169 −34.5369a −31.8168a −25.3062a −25.0081a
LLPTL
β 18.0002a 20.5102a 20.4884a
SE 11.9581 6.1476 5.0810
AME% 7.2977a 8.3678a 19.0128a
GHPI
β −11.8082a −8.0294a −13.0414a −10.1367a −12.2518a −14.9996a −10.3922b −9.2679a −16.3320a −16.8950a −16.8401a −12.8330a
SE 0.7100 1.6400 1.4633 1.3588 0.7338 1.4891 0.9543 1.4679 0.8243 1.4993 1.0103 1.2233
AME% −3.2840a −2.8361a −4.1012a −4.1096a −2.7516a −5.6148a −6.3654a −3.7811a −1.6334a −6.6160a −11.8638a −11.9087a
SL
β 2.3327a 2.2009a 2.1595a −0.9551b 2.7928a 2.4410a 4.5441a 3.9445a 2.2307a 2.3423a 4.2429a 3.5135a
SE 0.1377 0.2429 0.3850 0.4718 0.1448 0.2372 0.3478 0.4437 0.1479 0.2350 0.3504 0.3618
AME% 0.6487a 0.7773a 0.6791a −0.3872b 0.6272a 0.9137a 2.7833a 1.6093a 0.2231a 0.9172a 2.9891a 3.2605a
GFC
β 1.7208a 1.6672a 1.7609a 1.7093a 2.4787a 1.6290a 2.0769a 3.0810a 3.5303a 2.9303a 3.3281a 4.8514a
SE 0.1319 0.2904 0.2593 0.3044 0.1392 0.2998 0.2174 0.3424 0.1290 0.2600 0.2226 0.2969
AME% 0.4786a 0. 5888a 0.5537a 0.6930a 0.5566a 0.6098a 1.2722a 1.2570a 0.3531a 1.1475a 2.3447a 4.5020a
FOPCT


















Panel A: Regression results


























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
SE 0.1368 0.2568 0.3237 0.4021 0.14717 0.2738 0.2120 0.3828 0.1289 0.2598 0.2167 0.2461
AME% 0.7529a 1.3585a 0.6647a 0.8191a 0.7104a 1.6686a 1.1277a 1.0678a 0.3267a 1.8116a 1.4466a 3.1499 a
FDIC
β 2.8677a 3.9195a 1.9182a 0.1997 2.4352a 3.0064a 2.9880a 1.3465a 1.4718a 1.8555a 2.0219a 0.3370
SE 0.1399 0.2334 0.3215 0.2826 0.1502 0.2303 0.3095 0.3201 0.1426 0.2292 0.2945 0.2151
AME% 0.7975a 1.3844a 0.6032a 0.0809 0.5469a 1.1254a 1.8302a 0.5493a 0.1472a 0.7266a 1.4244a 0.3127
FED
β 2.8925a 3.8668a 1.9393a 0.4448 2.4565a 3.2687a 2.7800a 1.1506a 1.4033a 2.1849a 1.7908a 0.3549
SE 0.1853 0.3366 0.4273 0.3625 0.1925 0.3124 0.3721 0.7462 0.1974 0.3092 0.3535 0.2743
AME% 0.8044a 1.3658a 0.6098a 0.1803 0.5517a 1.2236a 1.7028a 0.4694a 0.1403a 0.8556a 1.2616a 0.3294
Panel B: Goodness of fit measures
Wald Chi2 1923a 140a 364a 551a 1308a 655a 1025a 177a 1560a 617a 671a 421a
Log likelihood −3,230 −952 −596 −392 −4,606 −1,064 −1,167 −843 −4,683 −1,101 −1,273 −803
R2 0.7722 0.7901 0.7872 0.7678 0.5131 0.6240 0.6088 0.4522 0. 2,998 0.5564 0.5107 0.5532
No. of “0” 257,801 62,329 45,696 22,627 239,877 57,999 40,643 20,122 223,809 54,301 36,202 18,030
No. of “1” 1,546 512 284 175 1,337 403 321 230 1,040 308 285 194
Panel C: Model performance
All banks Small banks Medium banks Large banks
AUROC-W 0.9805 0.9767 0.9864 0.9709
AUROC-H 0.9785 0.9077 0.9212 0.9869
Notes: a (b) [c] significant at the 1% (5%) [10%] level (two-sided test). Panel A presents multivariate panel logistic regression results with control variables for 1-year (columns 2 to 5), 2-years
(columns 6 to 9), and 3-years (columns 10 to 13) lagged periods across different size categories. The sampling period runs between 1985–2016. We consider banks corresponding to the bottom
25 percentile of total assets as small banks, those in the top 25 percentile as large banks, and the rest medium banks. If a bank fails in year t, the bank's failure indicator is “1” in that year t
and “0” otherwise. A positive coefficient (β) suggests a positive relationship with failure likelihood and vice-versa. SE is standard error of respective coefficients and AME is Average Marginal
Effects in percentage. Panel B reports the chi-square, the likelihood ratio and the coefficient of determination (McKelvey and Zavoina's R2) to measure the model's goodness of fit. No. of “1”
counts the number of failures in our sample, while No. of “0” counts the number of “non-failure” observations. Panel C shows the accuracy of models' performance measured by area under

















TABLE 7 Multivariate regression models with interaction between bank size and bank charted
Panel A: Regression results
Without control variables With control variables
1 year lag 2 years lag 3 years lag 1 year lag 2 years lag 3 years lag




% β SE AME% β SE
AME
% β SE AME%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19)
NCOTA 38.998a 2.7118 14.73a 35.666a 3.7124 5.99a 29.939a 4.1816 2.66a 27.606a 3.8695 6.50a 31.308a 4.5665 6.74a 33.890a 6.4200 2.55a
PD90TA 30.512a 3.6420 11.52a 67.238a 4.7684 11.30a 66.400a 4.8608 5.90a 41.919a 5.3508 9.87a 70.985a 5.8977 15.27a 100.822a 7.4880 7.58a
LLRTA 40.001a 3.9157 15.11a 91.097a 5.9487 15.31a 40.211a 5.9427 3.58a 37.022a 5.5305 8.71a 60.303a 6.6313 12.97a 30.747a 8.7848 2.31a
TETA −75.874a 2.2259 −28.65a −40.615a 1.8965 −6.83a −12.508a 1.2240 −1.11a −83.817a 2.9414 −19.73a −46.240a 2.2630 −9.95a −26.354a 2.0396 −1.98a
OREOTA 25.653a 1.9475 9.69a 58.195a 3.1593 9.78a 48.086a 2.8721 4.28a 16.834a 2.5731 3.96a 37.812a 3.3371 8.13a 42.443a 4.4424 3.19a
NIETA 3.459c 1.9709 1.31c −0.480 2.9576 −0.08 2.792 2.8957 0.25 15.257a 2.6780 3.59a 7.812a 3.0852 1.68a 15.721a 4.0011 1.18a
MB −0.276b 0.1330 −0.11a −1.272a 0.1888 −0.15a −1.264a 0.1686 −0.07a −0.218 0.1692 −0.09a −0.751a 0.1895 −0.09a −1.395a 0.2405 −0.05a
LB 0.057 0.1457 −0.03 −1.108a 0.2077 −0.11a −1.110a 0.1869 −0.05a 0.511a 0.1843 −0.02 −0.107 0.2002 −0.03 −1.022a 0.2650 −0.03a
SC 0.316b 0.1258 0.09a −0.953a 0.1836 −0.08a −1.487a 0.1684 −0.08a −6.359a 0.8218 −10.75a −7.894a 0.8515 −18.5a −9.594a 1.1271 −16.2a
MB × SC −0.040 0.1602 0.845a 0.2230 1.099a 0.2052 −0.255 0.2145 0.583a 0.2301 1.353a 0.2894
LB × SC −0.194 0.1789 0.947a 0.2512 1.259a 0.2315 −1.049a 0.2402 −0.012 0.2497 1.233a 0.3239
GHPI −11.935a 0.7770 −2.81a −11.666a 0.7378 −2.51a −17.606a 1.0134 −1.32a
FOPCT 2.673a 0.1496 0.63a 3.074a 0.1427 0.66a 3.449a 0.1621 0.26a
SL 2.595a 0.1441 0.61a 3.319a 0.1440 0.71a 2.991a 0.1619 0.22a
GFC 1.790a 0.1390 0.42a 2.576a 0.1403 0.55a 3.764a 0.1542 0.28a
FED 9.141a 0.8382 2.15a 9.295a 0.8519 2.00a 9.138a 1.1092 0.69a
FDIC 9.077a 0.8261 2.14a 9.222a 0.8411 1.98a 9.191a 1.0954 0.69a
Panel B: Goodness of fit measures
Wald Chi2 2616a 1692a 1540a 1586a 1387a 1187a
Log likelihood −4,689 −6,665 −7,137 −2,941 −4,234 −4,408
R2 0.7599 0.299 0.0889 0.8093 0.6433 0.4554
No. of “0” 276,973 258,269 240,317 257,800 239,877 223,809
No. of “1” 1,687 1,554 1,342 1,546 1,337 1,040
Notes: a (b) [c] significant at the 1% (5%) [10%] level (two-sided test). Panel A presents multivariate panel logistic regression results with interaction terms (between bank size and the bank
charted) for 1-, 2-, and 3-years lagged periods. Size category “Small Banks” and bank charted “National Charted” are considered reference groups, and thus main and interaction effects are
reported for medium banks (MB), large banks (LB) and State charted banks (SC). Results are reported separately for multivariate models without control variables (columns 2 to 10) and with
control variables (columns 11 to 19). The sampling period runs between 1985–2016. We consider banks corresponding to the bottom 25 percentile of total assets as small banks, those in the
top 25 percentile as large banks, and the rest medium banks. If a bank fails in year t, the bank's failure indicator is “1” in that year t and “0” otherwise. A positive coefficient (β) suggests a pos-
itive relationship with failure likelihood and vice-versa. SE is standard error of respective coefficients and AME is average marginal effects in percentage. Panel B reports the chi-square, the
likelihood ratio and the coefficient of determination (McKelvey and Zavoina's R2) to measure the model's goodness of fit. No. of “1” counts the number of failures in our sample, while No. of

















TABLE 8 Multivariate regression models using alternative bank size cut-off
Panel A: Regression results
Without control variables With control variables
Variable Small banks Medium banks Large banks Small banks Medium banks Large banks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
NCOTA
β 61.0199a 107.2142a 37.2589a 45.9734
SE 2.7163 26.0847 3.2149 33.9338
AME% 23.0172a 45.4571a 11.8165a 14.9293
PD90TA
β 34.2282a 76.9234c 0.0598 17.2857a 133.9925a −3.3178
SE 3.6994 44.3149 43.2590 4.4076 54.1602 53.8908
AME% 12.9111a 32.6143c 0.0440 5.4821a 43.5124a −3.2719
LLRTA
β 79.9810a 33.3856 35.6659 79.9705a 108.3962b −16.5536
SE 4.1900 35.7125 32.5191 4.3175 51.0881 44.9606
AME% 30.1695a 14.1549 26.2155 25.3623a 35.2003b −16.3246
TETA
β −44.7655a −23.2248a −42.4832a −22.3881a
SE 10.3977 7.6490 13.7155 8.7300
AME% −18.9799a −17.0709a −13.7959a −22.0784a
OREOTA
β 42.1623a 0.2320 26.8148a 24.0758
SE 2.0045 19.0124 1.9264 25.1644














β −64.0055b −30.3796 −56.3185 −30.3595
SE 28.0799 21.2082 39.2101 25.0292
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TABLE 8 (Continued)
Panel A: Regression results
Without control variables With control variables
Variable Small banks Medium banks Large banks Small banks Medium banks Large banks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
GHPI
Β −11.4753a −14.4901a −10.2888a
SE 0.6820 3.2148 2.6440






β 1.8375a 2.3089a 2.1645b
SE 0.1354 0.9283 1.0859






β 3.4747a −0.2916 −1.0419
SE 0.1349 0.7703 0.6427
AME% 1.1020a 0.0947 −1.0274
FED
β 3.6334a −0.2368 −1.6951
SE 0.1817 0.9574 1.0726
AME% 1.1523a 0.0769 −1.6716
Panel B: Goodness of fit measures
Wald Chi2 2573a 127a 72a 4870a 71a 54a
Log likelihood −5,270 −83 −106 −3,478 −52 −67
R2 0.4666 0.6345 0.3338 0.6849 0.6931 0. 4,963
No. of “0” 262,768 4,417 2,828 244,409 3,878 1,645
No. of “1” 1,620 31 24 1,478 28 21
Notes: a (b) [c] significant at the 1% (5%) [10%] level (two-sided test). Panel A presents multivariate panel logistic regression results with and
without control variables for 1-year lagged periods across different size categories. The sampling period runs between 1985–2016. We con-
sider small banks (total assets, or TA, up to $1 billion), medium banks (TA exceeding $1 billion and up to $3 billion), and large banks (TA
exceeding $3 billion). If a bank fails in year t, the bank's failure indicator is “1” in that year t and “0” otherwise. A positive coefficient (β) sug-
gests a positive relationship with failure likelihood and vice-versa. SE is standard error of respective coefficients and AME is Average Mar-
ginal Effects in percentage. Panel B reports the chi-square, the likelihood ratio and the coefficient of determination (McKelvey and Zavoina's
R2) to measure the model's goodness of fit. No. of “1” counts the number of failures in our sample, while No. of “0” counts the number of
“non-failure” observations.
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clearly supports the necessity of distinction between dif-
ferent size classes when analysing bank failures.
4.4.3 | Medium banks
Table 5 (columns 4, 8 and 12) shows that five out of six
main variables (NCOTA, PD90TA, LLRTA, OREOTA,
and TETA) of the multivariate regression model for
medium banks remain the same as the multivariate
models estimated for all and small banks. They are statis-
tically significant and have the expected sign of respective
coefficients across all lagged periods. The sixth main vari-
able is NIM, which is also statistically significant and has
a negative sign across the three lagged periods, suggesting
that a larger amount of returns generated by investments
reduces the probability of failure for medium banks. This
is consistent with the hypothesis that banks dealing
heavily with risky loans tend to have higher net interest
margins (Angbazo, 1997).
Table 6 (columns 4, 8 and 12) reports the results after
introducing control variables. All variables (main and
control) are statistically significant and all coefficients
hold the same sign previously reported except NCOTA,
which is insignificant for 2- and 3-years lagged estimates.
Both within-sample and out-of-sample classification of
all multivariate models across all time periods are above
81%, which is considered to be excellent (see Appen-
dix A1).
4.4.4 | Large banks
As reported in Table 5 (columns 5, 9 and 13), multivari-
ate regression models for large banks contain the ratio of
loan loss provisions to total loans (LLPTL) as one of the
main variables that has not been reported for all, small,
and medium banks. The coefficient on LLPTL is positive
and statistically significant for 1- and 2-years lagged esti-
mates but becomes insignificant for the 3-years lagged
estimate. This indicates that risky loan portfolios increase
the probability of failure of large banks more than other
banks. Similarly, Poghosyan and Čihak (2011) find that
the deterioration of the loan portfolio enhances the prob-
ability of bank default. The rest of the main variables
(PD90TA, LLRTA, TETA, and NIM) are statistically sig-
nificant and have a sign consistent with univariate
regression estimates across all three-time lagged periods.
In the presence of control variables, three out of the
five main variables are statistically significant and have
the same sign as those of large banks' multivariate
models estimated without control variables across three
lagged periods (see Table 6). However, of the other two
variables, NIM is insignificant for the 1-year lagged
period, and PD90TA is insignificant for 2- and 3-years
lagged estimates. The control variables are statistically
significant, and their coefficients have expected signs,
except primary regulators (FED and FDIC) are insignifi-
cant for the 1- and 3-years lagged estimates.
The within-sample and out-of-sample AUROC esti-
mated for multivariate models for large banks are close
to, or higher than, 0.80, implying superior classification
performance across all time periods (see Appendix A1).
Yet the shapes of ROC curves of hold-out sample esti-
mates are steps rather than concave, due to the scarcity
of failures in out-of-sample validation.
5 | ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
5.1 | Interaction between bank size and
bank charter
To test the hypothesis that the impact of bank size on
the probability of bank failures varies with bank char-
ter, we add interaction between bank size and bank
charter to the multivariate regression models reported
in Table 4. Table 7 reports the results of multivariate
regression models with interaction terms for bank size
and bank charter. These results are presented with
and without control variables, and for the three lagged
periods. The size category “Small Banks” and bank
charter “National Chartered Banks” are taken as the
reference group, and thus main and interaction effects
are reported for medium banks, large banks and state-
chartered banks. The notable result of interactions
between bank size and bank charter is that all explan-
atory variables, as well as control variables, are statisti-
cally significant and have signs consistent with our
expectation.7 This shows the robustness and consis-
tency of our explanatory variables.
The impact of medium sized banks (MB) is signifi-
cantly negative across all estimates, but the main effect of
large banks (LB) is only significantly negative for 2- and
3-years lagged estimates. These results are robust to the
inclusion of control variables. The sign and statistically
significant differences between medium and large banks
for the 1-year lagged period, which is the main concern
of this paper, confirms our main result that the probabil-
ity of bank failures varies with size categories. The effects
of state-chartered banks are significantly negative for all
estimates with and without control variables.8 This is
mostly consistent with Danisewicz, McGowan, Onali,
and Schaeck (2017), who show that the depositor prefer-
ence law leads to less risk taking, and a lower probability
of failure among state-chartered banks.9
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TABLE 9 Financial crises and normal times
Panel A: Regression results
Variable
All banks Small banks
Banking crises Market crises Normal times Banking crises Market crises Normal times
β SE AME% β SE AME% β SE AME% β SE AME% β SE AME% β SE AME%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19)
NCOTA 13.07a 4.58 9.28a 24.99b 11.54 3.76 b 28.22a 6.53 3.79a 20.71b 9.77 11.84b 23.68 17.48 6.51 26.43a 10.38 5.29a
PD90TA 17.34a 6.37 12.30a 28.49b 13.22 4.28b 39.96a 9.18 5.36a 33.32a 11.88 19.05a 45.38 b 19.36 12.47 b 10.52 14.20 2.11
LLRTA 48.11a 6.21 34.13a 69.45a 15.43 10.44a 54.85a 9.57 7.36a 55.07a 13.90 31.48a 40.08 c 22.40 11.01 c 89.77a 13.72 17.97a
TETA −70.40a 3.11 −49.95a −51.27a 7.66 −7.71a −98.57a 5.19 −13.22a
OREOTA 12.16a 2.89 8.63a 2.39 8.46 0.36 19.17a 4.06 2.57a 24.02a 5.91 13.73a −0.80 13.16 −0.22 25.25a 5.68 5.06a
NIETA 7.84a 3.18 5.56a 36.45a 6.43 5.48a 15.91a 4.04 2.13a 33.84a 6.53 19.34a 45.72 a 9.82 12.56 a 41.70a 6.53 8.35a
TIETLB 47.45a 13.74 27.12a 17.64 21.22 4.85 28.48a 7.12 5.70a
TDTA 29.37a 4.87 16.79a 37.03 a 9.31 10.18 a 39.68a 4.75 7.94a
Panel B: Goodness of fit measures
Wald Chi2 2054a 518a 700a 442a 209 a 498a
Log likelihood −1,685 −327 −907 −344 −140 −332
R2 0.7776 0.8473 0.797 0.8458 0.8775 0.7709
No. of “0” 57,668 45,976 154,156 13,926 10,808 37,595
No. of “1” 908 218 420 269 115 128
Panel C: Regression results
Variable
Medium banks Large banks
Banking crises Market crises Normal times Banking crises Market crises Normal times
β SE AME% β SE AME% β SE AME% β SE AME% β SE AME% β SE AME%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19)
NCOTA 9.96 13.12 5.17 −47.14 34.12 −9.43 33.05a 13.44 5.69a
PD90TA 25.50 20.61 13.22 −10.10 26.88 −2.02 14.99 26.78 2.58 79.96a 26.04 96.53a −960.30b 493.9 −9.78b 75.38 67.98 7.47
LLRTA 104.35a 20.49 54.12a 120.19b 51.23 24.05 b 56.08a 19.52 9.66a 28.76 18.75 34.73 430.60 291.87 4.39 147.42c 80.04 14.61c
TETA −63.56a 9.46 −32.96a −171.12a 48.29 −34.23 a −102.02a 10.92 −17.58a −59.96a 6.56 −72.39a −625.78b 295.70 −6.37b −123.09b 59.14 −12.20b
OREOTA 18.16b 8.43 9.42b 17.27 19.54 3.45 20.10a 8.19 3.46a
NIM −78.38a 17.85 −40.65a −17.44 25.22 −3.49 −41.51b 20.30 −7.15b −24.01c 14.92 −28.98c 543.82c 294.48 5.54c −69.24 47.17 −6.86
LLPTL 28.52a 6.32 34.43a 41.54 81.17 0.42 −12.10 20.44 −1.20
Panel D: Goodness of fit measures
Wald Chi2 92a 17b 207a 294a 5 20b
Log likelihood −241 −47 −174 −261 −13 −54
R2 0.6818 0.9341 0.8411 0.6932 0.9213 0.8730
No. of “0” 10,191 6,847 28,656 5,054 3,467 14,103
No. of “1” 98 21 95 121 5 35
Notes: a (b) [c] significant at the 1% (5%) [10%] level (two-sided test). Panels A and C present the results of checks to establish the robustness of our results. The crises include banking crises (the
credit crunch and the subprime lending crisis), market crises (the stock market crash; the Russian debt crisis; the dot.com bubble and September 11), and normal times. The sampling period runs
between 1985–2016. We consider banks corresponding to the bottom 25 percentile of total assets as small banks, those in the top 25 percentile as large banks, and the rest medium banks. If a bank
fails in year t, the bank's failure indicator is “1” in that year t and “0” otherwise. A positive coefficient (β) suggests a positive relationship with failure likelihood and vice-versa. SE is standard error
of respective coefficients and AME is Average Marginal Effects in percentage. Panels B and D report the chi-square, the likelihood ratio and the coefficient of determination (McKelvey and

















Turning to the effects of bank size and bank charter,
we observe a negative but insignificant relationship
between medium sized banks and bank charter
“MB × State Charter” for the 1-year lagged estimate.
However, this relationship becomes positive and statisti-
cally significant for 2- and 3-years lagged estimates. For
interaction terms between large sized banks and bank
charter “LB × State Charter”, we find relatively similar
findings of “MB × State Charter”. These results are
robust to the presence of control variables. Overall, the
impact of bank size on probability of bank failures varies
with bank charter, and it might be appropriate to con-
sider this when predicting the failure of US banks.
5.2 | Alternative size classification
One may argue to what extent the main results are driven
by our definition of size classes. We rerun our analyses
using Berger and Bouwman (2013) bank size cut-off,
which is widely used in literature. They split the bank
size classes into small banks (total assets, or TA, up to $1
billion), medium banks (TA exceeding $1 billion and up
to $3 billion), and large banks (TA exceeding $3 billion).
This reclassifies around 90% of our medium and large
banks as small banks.
Table 8 shows the results using this alternative cut-
off. Clearly, small banks results are similar to the main
results. For medium banks, the results are relatively com-
parable to the main results. An obvious exception is the
other real estate owned (OREOTA), which is insignifi-
cant with and without control variables. For large banks,
only the capital (TETA) and the ratio of loan loss provi-
sions to total loans (LLPTL) are similar to the main
results. This inconsistency of results specifically for
medium banks and more for large banks may attributed
to the huge reduction in the bank failures sample
impacted by different size cut-off.
5.3 | Crisis periods
According to Berger and Bouwman (2013), the effects of
financial crises are likely to differ by crisis type. To test
the reliability of our multivariate results, we examine
bank failures during banking crises (the credit crunch
and subprime lending crisis), market crises (the 1987
stock market crash, the 1998 Russian debt crisis and
long-term capital management bailout, the dot.com bub-
ble, and the September 11 terrorist attack [2000–2002]),
and normal times (all non-crisis years) as three separate
groups. We rerun all multivariate regressions separately
for all, small, medium, and large banks with the same
control variables used in the main multivariate regres-
sions (see Section 3.4.3) with the exception of the credit
crunch and subprime lending crisis, to avoid collinearity.
Table 9 reports the findings for all, small, medium,
and large banks across various types of financial crises
and normal times. For all banks, the results are the same
at all times except that OREOTA becomes insignificant
during the market crises. For small banks, all variables
are significant with expected signs and have AMEs above
5% during banking crises. However, some variables
(NCOTA, OREOTA, and TIETLB) during market crises
and PD90TA during normal times become insignificant.
For medium and large banks, the main result is that the
ratio of total equity to total assets (TETA) remains signifi-
cant with high AMEs at all times, primarily during bank-
ing crises. This is in line with Berger and
Bouwman (2013) who find that higher capital improves
the probability of surviving for medium and large banks
during banking crises. Other findings among medium
and large banks are relatively similar to the main results.
6 | CONCLUSION
The threat of bank failures influences not only the stabil-
ity of the financial system but also the economy as a
whole. For example, the failure of small banks in the
early 1990s and the failure of large banks during the
recent financial crisis are associated with considerable
loan problems, profit reductions, credit risk, ineffective
board of directors and their management, high unem-
ployment, and low economic performance. Thus, a thor-
ough analysis of such failures is central to policymakers,
regulators, bank managers, and academics. Moreover,
our results indicate meaningful institutional and policy
implications. In effect, our findings emphasize the impor-
tance of considering bank size when designing appropri-
ate policies and regulations targeted toward enhancing
financial stability and resilience.
Although the literature has clarified the relevant
drivers of bank failures, typically existing studies have
not empirically analyzed the factors and the extent to
which they are linked to the probability of bank failures
across different size classes. In this study, we contribute
to the extant literature by recognizing the differences in
US bank failures engendered by size heterogeneity. We
develop separate early-warning models for small,
medium, and large banks, and report any differences in
comparison to all bank failures prediction models,
irrespective of bank size. We also compare the consis-
tency (statistical significance and average marginal
effects) of covariates when analysing bank failures across
size categories. Furthermore, we contribute to the
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existing body of literature by using a statistical module
building strategy suggested by Gupta et al. (2018) to
develop parsimonious multivariate models from an
exhaustive list of 61 accounting-based variables that have
been employed significant predictors in existing bank
failure literature.
The main empirical results show that factors associ-
ated with bank failures and the magnitudes of mutually
significant factors (Average Marginal Effects) vary across
small, medium, and large size categories. Further inter-
esting results of this study are as follows. First, credit risk
has a significant impact on bank failures probability
across size classes and for the three lagged periods,
implying that weak assets quality, represented by net
charge off, past due 90+ days, loan loss reserves, and
other real estate owned, increases the risk of failure. Sec-
ond, small banks are most likely to fail if they have high
deposit ratios, are more cost inefficient, and have a high
liquidity risk, while medium and large banks with poor
capital and low net interest margins are more likely
to fail.
Our results are robust to up-to 3 years of lagged
regression estimates, the inclusion of various control vari-
ables such as regulatory effects and house price inflation,
interaction between bank size and bank charter, using an
alternative bank size classification, and macroeconomic
crisis periods and normal times. Moreover, the AUROC
of all multivariate models developed across bank size
classes for out-of-sample have an excellent performance
for different forecast horizons.
This study has several interesting implications. As
there is a lack of attention in the banking literature on
the effects of factors on bank failures, the magnitude of
these effects, and how they might differ across different
size categories, it provides a thorough understanding of
these issues. Given our findings that different factors
have different effects on bank failures across bank size
classes, researchers and policymakers developing early-
warning models for predicting vulnerabilities leading to
distress in banks should, whenever possible, take into
consideration the differences in bank incentives engen-
dered by size heterogeneity. Our approach, which
develops separate early-warning models for small,
medium, and large banks, and report any differences in
comparison to all bank failures prediction models,
irrespective of bank size, is one possibility to do so and
can improve bank stability. Thus, our findings support
bank regulators efforts to enhance the entire financial
system.
The key limit to our study is the information content
of market-based indicators. As the vast majority of com-
mercial banks in the United States are not publicly
traded, we focus on financial ratios based on accounting
data. This limitation presents an opportunity for future
work by using sample of publicly listed banks in devel-
oped and/or developing countries, and replicate our anal-
ysis supplemented with market-based measures.
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ENDNOTES
1 Berger and Bouwman (2013) is an exception. They examine the
impact of capital on bank performance (survival and market
share) and how this effect differs among bank size classes (small,
medium, and large) and across banking crises, market crises, and
normal times. However, they focus only on one of the six
CAMELS components that may misclassify distressed banks.
2 However, we use their classification to report the robustness of
our findings.
3 The total of the count of banks across respective size categories is
higher than the total number of banks in our sample due to the
dynamic nature of banks' total assets. A bank may start small, but
eventually move to the medium or large size categories as its total
assets increases, or vice versa. For instance, a bank which is classi-
fied as small in 1990 may be classified as medium or large in 1995
due to increased asset size and vice-versa. Thus, some banks may
appear in more than one size categories, but in different time
periods.
4 For more information about other authors, see Column 6 in
Table A1.
5 While calculating the financial ratios, zero values for all bank-
year observations are replaced with $1 to avoid missing values.
6 Summary statistics and correlation tables are not reported to save
space, but are available from the authors upon request. A sum-
mary discussion on them is as follow: the mean of covariates bear-
ing a positive relationship with bank failures (e.g., PD90TA) is
expected to be higher for the failed group of banks than for its
non-failed counterpart, and vice-versa. Contrarily, TETA, for
instance, is expected to have a negative relationship with bank
failures, and its mean across all size categories show that its value
is lower for the failed group of observations than for its non-failed
counterpart. Our expectations are well supported by all covariates
across respective size categories except TDTA. The mean of TDTA
for failed groups of banks is higher than for its non-failed counter-
part, implying that failed banks have higher total deposits. This is
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contrary to the intuition, where we expect failed banks to have
funding and liquidity problems, and hence lower total deposits.
Generally, median values of respective covariates reported are
also sufficiently close to their respective mean values, thus prob-
lems that could arise due to significant skewness are not expected.
Additionally, there is no unexpected variability in the values of
standard deviation, minimum, and maximum for all variables
across different bank size categories. The correlation matrix shows
that some of the variables exhibit moderate to strong correlation
with other variables. Issues associated with multicollinearity
therefore has been addressed carefully when developing multivar-
iate models.
7 Except NIETA, which is insignificantly negative for 2-years lagged
estimate and positive for 3-years lagged time without control
variables.
8 An exception is the coefficient of the 1-year lagged time without
control variables, which is significantly positive.
9 State chartered banks were subject to depositor preference law
(DPL), which changes the priority structure of debt claims, from
1909, whereas nationally chartered banks were subject to DPL
from 1993 onwards.
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TABLE A1 Description of variables
No. Category Variable Description CALL item codes Source
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bank size LTA Natural logarithm of total assets rcfd2170 (Bertay et al., 2013)
Explanatory variables
1 Capital (C) TETA Total equity divided by total assets rcfd3210/ rcfd2170 (Berger et al., 2016)
2 T1CR Tier1 capital ratio rcfd7206 (Betz et al., 2014)
3 NPACR Nonperforming assets coverage ratio = [(Equity
+ LLR) - Weighted NPA] divided by total
assets
[(rcfd3210+ rcfd3123) - (0.20*rcfd1406




4 Asset quality (A) LLRTA Loan loss reserves divided by total assets rcfd3123/rcfd2170 (Cole & White, 2012)
5 PD90TA Loans past due 90+ days divided by total assets rcfd1407/rcfd2170 (Cole & Wu, 2009)
6 NAATA Nonaccrual loans divided by total assets rcfd1403/rcfd2170 (Cole & Wu, 2009)
7 OREOTA Other real estate owned divided by total assets rcfd2150/rcfd2170 (Cole & Wu, 2009)
8 NPATA Non-performing assets (PD38-89 + PD90
+ Nonaccrual loans + Other real estate
owned) divided by total assets
(rcfd1406 + rcfd1407+ rcfd1403 + rcfd2150)/
rcfd2170
(Cole & White, 2012)
9 LLRNPL Loan loss reserves divided by non-performing
loans
rcfd3123/rcfd2170
10 LLPTL Loan loss provisions divided by total loans riad4230/rcfd2122 (Poghosyan &
Čihak, 2011)
11 LLPTA Loan loss provisions divided by total assets riad4230/rcfd2170 (Kolari et al., 2002)
12 NPLTL Non-performing loans divided by total loans (rcfd1407 + rcfd1403)/rcfd2122 (Danisewicz et
al., 2017)
13 NPLTA Non-performing loans divided by total assets (rcfd1407 + rcfd1403)/rcfd2170 (Wheelock &
Wilson, 2000)
14 NCOTA Net-charge offs divided by total assets (riad4635-riad4605)/rcfd2170 (Kolari et al., 2002)
15 RELTA Real estate loans divided by total assets rcfd1410/rcfd2170 (Ng &





rcfd1766/rcfd2170 (Cole & White, 2012)
17 CLTA Consumer loans divided by total asset rcfd1975/rcfd2170 (Cole & White, 2012)
18 CDLTA Construction & development loans divided by
total assets
rcon1415/rcfd2170 (Cole & White, 2012)
19 RERLTA Real estate residential (1–4) family loans
divided by total assets




















No. Category Variable Description CALL item codes Source
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bank size LTA Natural logarithm of total assets rcfd2170 (Bertay et al., 2013)
20 REMLTA Real estate residential multifamily loans divided
by total assets
rcon1460/rcfd2170 (Cole & White, 2012)
21 RENFNRLTA Real estate nonfarm non-residential loans
divided by total assets
rcon1480/rcfd2170 (Cole & White, 2012)




23 CIR Cost to income ratio; operating expenses
divided by operating income
riad4130/riad4000 (Poghosyan &
Čihak, 2011)
24 Earnings (E) NIM Net interest margin; net interest income divided
by average earning assets
riad4074/rcfd3402 (Betz et al., 2014)
25 ROA Return on assets; net income divided by total
assets
riad4340/rcfd2170 (Arena, 2008)




27 Liquidity (L) CDTA Cash & due divided by total asset rcfd0010/rcfd2170 (Cole & White, 2012)
28 TSTA Total securities divided by total assets rcfd8641/rcfd2170 (Cole & White, 2012)
29 TLTA Total loans divided by total assets rcfd2122/rcfd2170 (Kolari et al., 2002)




31 LATA Liquid assets (Cash & due from banks +
securities held for investment + securities
held for sale) divided by total assets
[rcfd0010 + (rcfd0390 & rcfd1773 + rcfd1754)]//
rcfd2170
(Arena, 2008)




33 TRADTA Trading asset divided by total assets rcfd3545/rcfd2170 (DeYoung &
Torna, 2013)




35 Sensitivity to market TIOI Trading income divided by operating income riada220/riad4000 (Betz et al., 2014)
36 Funding TDTA Total deposits divided by total assets rcfd2200/rcfd2170 (Acharya &
Naqvi, 2012)
37 STDTD Short-term deposits (transaction deposits +
demand deposits) divided by total deposits
(rcon2215 + rcon2210)/rcfd2200 (Berger et al., 2016)
38 BDTA Brokered deposits divided by total assets rcon2365/rcfd2170 (Cole & White, 2012)
39 LCDTA Large certificates of deposits ($100,000 & more)
divided by total assets


















No. Category Variable Description CALL item codes Source
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bank size LTA Natural logarithm of total assets rcfd2170 (Bertay et al., 2013)
40 LCDTLB Large certificates of deposits divided by total
liabilities
rcon2604/rcfd2948 (Cole & Wu, 2009)
41 MBSTA Mortgage-backed securities divided by total
assets
rcfd8639/rcfd2170 (Cole & White, 2012)
42 Business model NDFTLB Non-deposit funding divided by total liabilities rcfd2527/rcfd2948 (Köhler, 2015)
43 NIIOI Non-interest income divided by operating
income
riad4079/riad4000 (Bertay et al., 2013)
44 Leverage TATE Total assets divided by total equity rcfd2170/rcfd3210
45 TLBTE Total liabilities divided by total equity rcfd2950/rcfd3210 (Betz et al., 2014)
46 TLBTA Total liabilities divided by total assets rcfd2948/rcfd2170 (Danisewicz et
al., 2017)
47 TLTD Total loans divided by total deposits rcfd2122/rcfd2200 (Betz et al., 2014)
48 Growth GTA Growth of total assets (Cole & White, 2012)
49 GTL Growth of total loans (Berger et al., 2016)
50 Other GWTA Goodwill divided by total assets rcfd3163/rcfd2170 (Cole & White, 2012)
51 LIR Loans interest rate; total interest income
divided by total loans
riad4107/rcfd2122 (Arena, 2008)
52 Market discipline DIR Deposits interest rate; total interest expense
divided by total deposits
riad4073/rcfd2200 (Arena, 2008)
53 SPREAD LIR – DIR (Arena, 2008)




55 IRUITA Insurance & reinsurance underwriting income
divided by total assets
riadc386/rcfd2170 (DeYoung &
Torna, 2013)
56 VCRTA Venture capital revenue divided by total assets riadb491/rcfd2170 (DeYoung &
Torna, 2013)
57 FCSBTA Fees & commissions from securities brokerage
divided by total assets
riadc886/rcfd2170 (DeYoung & Torna, 2013)
58 NSITA Net securitization income divided by total assets riadb493/rcfd2170 (DeYoung &
Torna, 2013)
59 IBFCTA Investment banking fees & commissions
divided by total assets
riadb490/rcfd2170 (DeYoung &
Torna, 2013)
60 NSFTA Net servicing fees divided by total assets riadb492/rcfd2170 (DeYoung &
Torna, 2013)
61 Off balance sheet TUCTA Total unused commitment divided by total
assets.



















No. Category Variable Description CALL item codes Source
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bank size LTA Natural logarithm of total assets rcfd2170 (Bertay et al., 2013)
Control variables
62 Primary regulators FDIC Dummy variable indicating whether the bank is




63 FED Dummy variable indicating whether the bank is




64 Foreign ownership FOPCT Dummy variable indicating whether the bank is
foreign-owned (25% or more).
(Berger &
Bouwman, 2013)
65 Growth of house
prices index
GHPI State-level house price indices (HPIs) of the




66 Banking crises SL Dummy variable indicating whether the year is
on saving and loans crisis that occurred
between 1987 and 1990.
(Berger &
Bouwman, 2013)
67 GFC Dummy variable indicating whether the year is
on subprime lending crisis (Global financial
crisis) that occurred between 2008 and 2010.
(Berger &
Bouwman, 2013)
Notes: This table reports the set of explanatory and control variables that we use in our empirical analysis. The first column is the number of explanatory and control variables, while the sec-
ond column lists the category of explanatory and control variables. The third column lists names of variables. The fourth column provides their respective definitions. Financial information is


















A.1. | Table of area under ROC curves
The receiver operating characteristics (ROC) curve and
the area under the ROC (AUROC) curve are non-para-
metric measures to evaluate the classification perfor-
mance of early-warning models developed to identify
distressed banks (Betz et al., 2014). The ROC curve
describes the trade-off between true-positive (sensitivity: a
bank actually fails, and the model classifies it as expected
failure) and false-negative (1 – specificity: a bank actually
fails but the model classifies it as expected survival) for an
entire range of classification thresholds (Gupta et al., 2018).
However, ROC offers a range of performance assessments.
This means that the accuracy of the predicted class proba-
bilities is mostly overlooked. We therefore use the
AUROC, which is by far the most common non-paramet-
ric method for evaluating a fitted prediction model's abil-
ity to assign a randomly chosen positive instance higher
than a randomly chosen negative one (Betz et al., 2014;
Cole & White, 2012). In other words, the AUROC gauges
the ability of the prediction model to discriminate
between those banks which experience the event of inter-
est, and those which do not. Its value varies between 0.5
and 1.0, which summarizes the classification performance
of the model developed. The value of 1 represents a per-
fect model, whereas the value of 0.5 represents no dis-
crimination ability of the model. Generally, there is no
guide for classifying the predictive accuracy of a model
based on AUROC, however any value above 0.7 is accept-
able and above 0.8 is considered to be excellent (Hosmer
et al., 2013). Thus, the higher the AUROC, the better the
model's prediction performance. Although few studies (e.
g., Betz et al., 2014; Poghosyan & Čihak, 2011) in the liter-
ature of bank failures have reported the AUROC, from a
policy perspective and for the empirical tests in this paper
this metric is fundamental for comparing performance
and providing a validation of the models. Following the
approach of Gupta et al., (2018), we report area under
ROC (AUROC) curves for respective models to evaluate
the within-sample and out-of-sample classification perfor-
mance of the models developed. For within-sample vali-
dation, we estimate the models using the entire sample
data. To validate models' out-of-sample predictive perfor-
mance, we first estimate the models using all available
information up to the year 2011, and then predict the
probability of bank failures for the year 2012. Subse-
quently, we incorporate 2012 in the estimation sample
and predict the probability of bank failures for 2013 and
so on, up to the year 2016. Finally, we use these predicted
probabilities from the year 2012 until the year 2016 to
estimate out-of-sample AUROC for respective multivari-
ate regression models.
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